Facilitating the Industrial Sector\u27s Adoption of Collaborative Project Delivery Methods by Wood-Aliberch, Xavier
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Architectural Engineering -- Dissertations and 
Student Research 
Architectural Engineering and Construction, 
Durham School of 
4-2021 
Facilitating the Industrial Sector's Adoption of Collaborative 
Project Delivery Methods 
Xavier Wood-Aliberch 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, xwoodaliberch2@huskers.unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/archengdiss 
 Part of the Construction Engineering Commons, and the Construction Engineering and Management 
Commons 
Wood-Aliberch, Xavier, "Facilitating the Industrial Sector's Adoption of Collaborative Project Delivery 
Methods" (2021). Architectural Engineering -- Dissertations and Student Research. 66. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/archengdiss/66 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Architectural Engineering and Construction, Durham 
School of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Architectural 
Engineering -- Dissertations and Student Research by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University 
of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
FACILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR’S ADOPTION OF 
COLLABORATIVE PROJECT DELIVERY METHODS 
by 




Presented to the Faculty of 
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska 
In Partial Fulfilment of Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Science 
 
Major: Construction Engineering and Management 
 





FACILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR’S ADOPTION OF 
COLLABORATIVE PROJECT DELIVERY METHODS 
Xavier M. Wood-Aliberch, M.S. 
University of Nebraska, 2021 
Advisor: Philip Barutha 
In an effort to improve outcomes in the civil and healthcare sectors, clients have 
adopted collaborative project delivery methods for the delivery of their capital 
projects. The success stories in these sectors have gathered the attention of clients in 
the industrial sector, where cost and schedule overruns have become the norm. The 
central objective of this thesis is to help clients make the transition to this new type of 
project delivery. 
This thesis was written in a three-paper format, where each paper addresses a 
challenge with the adoption of collaborative delivery methods. The first paper 
investigates what type of industrial project would be a good candidate for 
collaborative delivery. Through seven semi-structured interviews and a web-based 
questionnaire with 49 responses, this paper reveals that risk/uncertainty is the primary 
driver for using a collaborative delivery method. In contrast to current guidelines, 
complexity was not found to be an important motivator for using this alternative 
delivery method. Evidence was also found to suggest that projects with higher dollar 
value are more suitable for collaborative delivery methods. 
The second paper explores lessons learned about the shared risk/reward commercial 
terms. Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore what practitioners 
in New Zealand and Australia have learned regarding these commercial terms. The 
interviews revealed five important lessons that will help clients in the industrial sector 
understand and implement these new legal instruments. 
The third paper in this thesis develops a framework to compare the performance of a 
project delivered collaboratively with one that is delivered under a traditional 
approach. A three-hour long research charrette with 12 industry professionals was 
used to develop the Project Success Framework. The framework consists of 11 Key 
Result Areas that clients should use to compare project performance. This framework 
will help clients determine if collaborative delivery methods are able to produce as 
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1. CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Current State 
Like the rest of the construction industry, the industrial sector has been plagued with 
the underperformance of its capital projects. In 2014, Ernst and Young conducted a 
study of 365 oil and gas megaprojects and found that 64% of these projects 
experienced cost overruns, and 73% experienced schedule overruns (Ernst and 
Young, 2014). In another study, Edward Merrow (2012) found that 65% of the 300 
industrial megaprojects investigated failed to meet their business objectives.  
The problem of underperformance is not unique to the industrial sector; there are a 
plethora of articles and investigations that have raised concerns about the success of 
the entire construction industry. In 2015, KPMG conducted a global survey of 
construction clients across a wide variety of construction sectors. They found that 
over 61% of clients had experienced one or more underperforming projects in the past 
financial year (KPMG, 2015). In a study by McKinsey and Company, they claim 
“construction has suffered for decades from remarkably poor productivity” 
(McKinsey & Company, 2017). Another study by McKinsey and Company found that 
98% of megaprojects suffer cost overruns of more than 30%, and 77% are at least 
40% late (Changali et al., 2015).  
In response to the concerning performance of the construction industry, a task force 
led by Sir John Egan was charged with identifying opportunities that could lead to 
improved efficiency and quality (Egan, 1998). Egan’s landmark report provided the 
construction industry with several recommendations on how the current situation 
could be improved. Egan’s team placed significant emphasis on the need to integrate 
the entire construction process, stating, “The efficiency of project delivery is presently 
2 
 
constrained by the largely separated processes through which they are generally 
planned, designed and constructed” (Egan, 1998). Egan also explains that the 
sequential nature of the conventional construction process is currently acting as a 
barrier to incorporating the knowledge of constructors in the design and planning 
stages of projects. Latham (1994) and Farmer (2016) both reinforce Egan’s 
proposition that the conventional construction process is playing a significant role in 
the problems with the delivery of capital projects.  
1.2 Problems with Traditional Delivery Methods 
Egan’s criticisms of the conventional project delivery process generated significant 
interest in understanding why the conventional delivery process results in poor project 
outcomes. Before these problems are explored, definition of the conventional project 
delivery process is provided.  
The conventional project delivery process is how most clients, suppliers, contractors, 
and designers engage in business. It is also known as the traditional approach, the 
design-bid-build (DBB) project delivery method, or the segregated services model 
(DBIA, 2015; Jackson, 2011). Under the traditional model, the client executes and 
manages two separate contracts for the design and construction services of their 
project. The designer and contractor have no legal obligation to communicate, and the 
client becomes the filter, or mediator, between the two parties. Figure 1-1 shows the 




Figure 1-1. Design-bid-build project delivery method contractual structure (DBIA, 
2015). 
The DBB delivery method is often referred to as a linear delivery method because the 
different phases of the project execute in a linear fashion; that is, all of the design is 
completed before any construction begins. Figure 1-1 also shows this sequential 
nature.  
The traditional delivery method has two frequently cited flaws: (1) it creates a 
misalignment of interests between clients and their service providers, and (2) it 
creates a fragmented and adversarial working environment (ADIRD, 2015; DTF 
Victoria, 2006; Hayford, 2018; Ross, 2003). A detailed review of why the traditional 
delivery process creates these problems is explored in the following sections. 
1.2.1 Misalignment of Financial and Non-Financial Interests  
With any enterprise, it is in a client’s best interest to purchase the best possible service 
for the lowest price (ADIRD, 2015). Therefore, when a client undertakes any 
enterprise, they have two primary interests: their non-financial interests, which relate 
to the product or service meeting their functional needs; and their financial interests, 
relating to the cost of the product or service. Jackson (2011) explains that when a 
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client purchases construction services, “incentives are always part of the contract, 
whether they are explicit or not”, and several authors have identified that the implicit 
incentives generated by the traditional contracts do not match the two primary 
interests of the client (Fischer et al., 2017; Hayford, 2018). The section below 
provides a brief overview of how traditional contracts create a misalignment between 
the interests of the service providers and their clients.  
The two traditional commercial agreements for purchasing construction services are 
through a lump sum or cost plus agreement. A range of variations to these agreements 
exist, including unit priced agreements, cost plus with a guaranteed maximum price 
(GMP), and different fee structures for the cost plus agreements. Although there are a 
wide range of variations, each one contains similar incentives. The lump sum and cost 
plus commercial agreements are defined as: 
Lump Sum: 
Under a lump sum commercial agreement, the contractor is paid a fixed 
price for the agreed scope of work, irrespective of the actual project 
costs (Ferreira & Rogerson, 1999). 
Cost Plus: 
Under a cost plus commercial agreement, the contractor is compensated 
for all of their construction related costs, plus an amount to cover their 
corporate overheads and profit (Ferreira & Rogerson, 1999).  
With a lump sum agreement, it is in the best interest of a service provider to minimize 
their costs while meeting the minimum conditions of satisfaction of their client 
(Jackson, 2011). So, while the financial interests are aligned under this model, the 
non-financial interests of the client and the service provider work in opposing 
directions. The client must therefore accept the risk that the final product will not 
meet their functional or quality requirements. 
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With a cost plus agreement, it is in the best interest of a supplier to maximize their 
costs as this will increase their absolute profit (Ferreira & Rogerson, 1999). Under 
this agreement, there is alignment of the project’s non-financial interests, as higher 
quality products will lead to higher project cost and thus profit, but a misalignment of 
the financial interests because the service provider has no incentive to control project 
costs. Under this agreement, the client must accept the risk that the project cost will 
be uncontrolled. 
Neither of these commercial terms enable a client to align their service providers’ 
interests with both their financial and non-financial interests. Figure 1-2 provides a 
graphical representation of this misalignment.  
 
Figure 1-2. Misalignment of interests between clients and their service providers on 
traditional agreements. 
1.2.2 Fragmentation and Adversarial Nature 
Another frequent criticism of the traditional contractual models is that they cause a 
fragmented and adversarial environment. Hayford (2018) explains that under the 
traditional model, a project effectively becomes the collection of sub projects: where 
the client has an agreement with the architect/engineer for the design, a separate 










agreement with a prime contractor for the construction, and the prime contractor has 
separate agreements with multiple subcontractors for separate scopes of work. Under 
this model, each service provider and their respective subcontractors are compensated 
for their individual scopes of work. The result is that each participant has a strong 
financial incentive to perform their individual responsibilities well, and little financial 
incentive to consider how their segment of work influences the overall performance of 
the project (Thomsen et al., 2016). Evidently, the interests within a single project 
become fragmented among each of the service providers. The client, however, has no 
interest in the performance of any one system or piece of equipment. Thomsen et. al 
(2016) gives a tangible example of how compensating service providers for their 
individual work, rather than the overall project, can cause the overall project to suffer:  
“Imagine a scenario where the design of the HVAC system is 
running over budget, but the plumbing design consultant realizes 
there is a way to revise the plumbing designs that would be cost 
effective and also allow the HVAC system to be rerouted in a more 
efficient way. If the plumbing design consultant is running up 
against its budgeted hours for the design development phase when it 
realizes this solution, and the HVAC system as currently designed 
does not hurt the plumbing designer at all, the economic incentive is 
for the plumbing designer to keep his head down and remain silent” 
(Thomsen et. al, 2016) 
To further the issue, when problems arise, which they inevitably do, it is in each 
individual’s best commercial interest to demonstrate that another party was 
responsible for the problem and should be liable for its financial repercussions 
(Hayford, 2018). Under the traditional commercial models, it is better for project 
participants to find someone else to blame for a problem rather than collectively 
searching for a solution. In extreme cases, parties are incentivized to search for the 
mistakes of others so that they can cover up their own shortcomings. Encouraging 
service providers to point blame rather than problem solve is why the traditional 
contractual agreements have been titled “inherently adversarial” (Hayford, 2018).  
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1.3 Collaborative Delivery Methods 
In response to the underperformance of large capital projects in the civil sector, 
government agencies in New Zealand and Australia adopted an alternative form of 
project delivery known as Project Alliancing (alliancing). The Australian Department 
of Infrastructure Regional Development define alliancing as “A delivery model where 
the owner(s), contractor(s), and consultant(s) work collaboratively as an integrated 
team and their commercial interests are aligned with actual project outcomes” 
(ADIRD, 2015). Gransberg et al. (2015) point out that alliancing is not to be 
misconstrued as the Australian term for the U.S. version of partnering.  
In 2004, the healthcare sector in the United States adopted a variant of the Australian 
alliance known as “Integrated Project Delivery” (IPD). The American Institute of 
Architects defines IPD as “a project delivery approach that integrates people, systems, 
business structures and practices into a process that collaboratively harnesses the 
talents and insights of all participants to optimize project results, increase value to the 
owner, reduce waste, and maximize efficiency through all phases of design, 
fabrication, and construction” (AIA, 2007). 
In comparison to the separate contracts required to deliver a project under a traditional 
delivery method, both alliancing and IPD delivery methods consist of a single multi-
party agreement between the primary project participants, as shown in Figure 1-3. 
Delivery methods that contain this multi-party agreement have often been referred to 
as “collaborative project delivery methods” (Engebø et al., 2020; Lahdenperä, 2012). 
For the remainder of this thesis, both the alliancing and IPD delivery methods will 
jointly be referred to as collaborative project delivery methods. Other terms that have 
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been used to describe these delivery methods include, relational project delivery 
methods, relational contracts, and alternative delivery methods.  
The Australian Department of Infrastructure Regional Development explain that the 
most significant difference between traditional delivery methods and a collaborative 
delivery method is the risk distribution (ADIRD, 2015). Traditional delivery methods 
are founded on the Abrahamson principle that risk should be allocated to the party 
best able to manage it. In contrast, collaborative delivery methods create a situation 
where each of the primary project participants collectively share the in the outcomes 
of the project (ADIRD, 2015).   
 
Figure 1-3. Multi-party agreement used on collaborative delivery methods. 
Some authors have included project partnering under the umbrella of collaborative 
project delivery methods (Engebø et al., 2020; Lahdenperä, 2012). Others such as 
Gransberg et al.  (2015) and Beckman-Cross (2016) have discussed that partnering 
should be separated from these delivery methods primarily because the risk 
distribution is different between partnering and IPD/alliancing. Under a partnering 
agreement it is possible for one organization may make profit while other 
organizations incur a financial loss. Under collaborative agreements, the financial 
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outcomes of the project are collectively shared by all of the participants. Because this 
distinction exists, partnering was excluded from this studies definition of a 
collaborative project delivery method.  
1.4 Research Needs 
In the civil and healthcare sectors of New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, 
collaborative delivery methods are now mature systems for delivering capital projects. 
Research has documented consistent success of these alternative approaches (Cheng, 
2012; Cohen, 2010; Gransberg & Jeong, 2019; Ross, 2000), begging the question: 
why are collaborative project delivery methods not being used in the industrial sector? 
This is the question that the Construction Industry Institute (CII) charged two research 
teams with exploring. CII is a center for research and development of capital projects 
with an emphasis in the heavy industrial sector. CII commissioned research team RT-
271 with exploring the following question: “if the capital project delivery industry did 
not exist and a new need was created for it, what would it look like?” (CII RT-271, 
2012). One of the suggestions RT-271 made was that the ideal delivery system would 
have collaborative financial management, or more specifically, there would be 
alignment on compensation. They also identified that the ideal system would contain 
relational contracts that involve the contractor in an integrated organization (CII RT-
271, 2012). These characteristics of the “ideal delivery system” closely resemble 
those of the collaborative delivery methods used in other construction sectors, which 
indicates that members of the industrial sector are interested in adopting these 




Following the findings from RT-271, CII charged RT-341 with exploring the business 
case of using collaborative delivery methods on industrial projects. Of the 85 
industrial projects CII’s RT-341 studied, they found that those implementing more 
collaborative and integrated practices had significantly more predictable project 
outcomes (CII RT-341, 2019). RT-341 concluded that industrial projects using more 
collaborative practices are benefitting from outcome certainty, and this should be a 
large driver for adopting collaborative delivery methods.  
The findings from both RT-271 and RT-341 demonstrate that there is a strong 
demand for a more collaborative approach to project delivery in the industrial sector. 
With RT-341 laying out the business case for adopting collaborative delivery 
methods, this study was charged with helping clients in the industrial sector make the 
transition to this new era of capital project delivery. The central research objective of 
this thesis was: 
To help facilitate the industrial sector’s adoption of collaborative project delivery 
methods. 
This research was limited to investigating the application of collaborative project 
delivery methods to industrial projects. The definition of an industrial project was 
adopted from Barutha (2018) who offers the following definition: “Industrial projects 
are capital investments designed by engineers to furnish specific process capacities to 
achieve business objectives, centered on the development of production capability” 
(Barutha, 2018). 
A literature review was conducted to examine where knowledge was lacking on the 
implementation of collaborative project delivery methods. Three gaps in knowledge 
were identified that, if addressed, would facilitate the industrial sectors adoption of 
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collaborative delivery methods. This thesis consists of three related papers that each 
address one of the needs identified below. 
1.4.1 1 – What Project is a Good Candidate for Collaborative Delivery? 
Once a client decides to explore alternative project delivery systems, often their first 
question is: what project is a good candidate for collaborative project delivery? The 
first paper in this thesis investigates this question. Existing research on collaborative 
delivery methods suggests that the decision to use a collaborative delivery method 
may be the single most important decision in a projects lifecycle (DTF Victoria, 
2006). Despite the importance of this decision, current guidance on what type of 
project is suitable for collaborative delivery remains vague, and at times, 
contradictory.  
1.4.2 2 – Lessons Learned About the Shared Risk/Reward Model 
The second paper in this thesis explores lessons learned about the commercial terms 
used on collaborative delivery methods. Collaborative delivery methods employ a 
shared risk/reward commercial model to promote collaboration between all of the key 
project stakeholders. These commercial terms are a foreign concept to clients in the 
industrial sector and a case study conducted by Cohen (2010) revealed that previous 
clients who have adopted the IPD delivery method took many months of contractual 
negotiations before they were content with the commercial terms. The objective of the 
second paper is to help clients understand and implement the terms in the shared 
risk/reward commercial model.   
1.4.3 3 – Framework for Evaluating Success 
The long-term adoption of collaborative delivery methods in the industrial sector is 
contingent on them providing superior outcomes to traditional delivery methods. 
12 
 
Once a client decides to adopt a collaborative project delivery method, it is necessary 
for them to determine how they will evaluate its performance. It may seem 
paradoxical that clients could deliver projects without knowing what it means, or how 
to evaluate their success, but a review of project management literature reveals that 
the topic of measuring project success has been widely contested (Chan, 2001). The 
final paper in this thesis addresses this gap by developing a project success framework 
that will enable clients compare the performance of an industrial projects delivered 
under different project delivery methods.  
1.5 Research Methodology 
Each paper in this thesis adopted a unique data collection methodology to best suit the 
needs of its research objective. The specific methodologies are detailed in each 
chapter, with data sources including semi-structured interviews, a web-based 
questionnaire, a research charrette, and a targeted survey.  
Chapter 2 used an exploratory mixed methods approach to understand what types of 
projects are good candidates for collaborative project delivery. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with seven subject matter experts from New Zealand and 
Australia. This was followed by a web-based questionnaire that was distributed to 
professionals in the industrial sector. 49 complete responses were received, and this 
quantitative component was used to test the hypotheses developed from the 
qualitative interviews. 
Chapter 3 used a qualitative approach to explore the lessons learned about the shared 
risk/reward commercial model. Data collection for this paper was coordinated with 
the paper in Chapter 2, therefore, the seven semi-structured interviews that were used 
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to answer the questions of Chapter 2 were also used to answer the questions for 
Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 used an exploratory mixed methods approach to develop a framework to 
evaluate the performance of collaborative delivery methods on industrial projects. A 
research charrette was initially conducted to develop the framework and then a 
targeted survey was distributed to professionals in the industrial sector to validate the 
framework. 12 members from the industrial sector participated in a three-hour long 
research charrette to develop the framework. 41 total responses were received from 
the targeted survey to help validate the metrics within the framework. 
The data collection sources for the three papers are summarized in Figure 1-4. 
 
Figure 1-4. Data collection summary of each paper. 
Prior to the collection of any data, a standard application was submitted to the 
Institution Review Board (IRB) of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. The IRB 
categorized the research as exempt and was approved with IRB #: 20191219809EX. 
A full copy of the approval letter is shown in Appendix A.  
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1.6 Significance of this Study 
Many forces are driving industrial projects to change. As our societies continue to 
grow at unprecedented rates, so does our demand for infrastructure, electricity, and 
other commodities. A study by McKinsey & Company forecasts that global 
infrastructure investment will reach $13 trillion by 2030, a 109% increase from the $6 
trillion spent in 2013 (Changali et al., 2015). To satisfy the increase in these demands, 
they also predict that “billion-dollar-plus megaprojects will account for a greater share 
of these projects”. Edward Merrow’s (2012) also predicts an increase in the average 
size of projects because doing so allows organizations to benefit from economies of 
scale.  
As the characteristics of industrial projects change, it is important that our methods 
and management practices adapt to meet the challenges these new projects present. 
The studies by EY, Merrows, and McKinsey and Company, suggest that the current 
delivery process is unable to manage the challenges of modern industrial capital 
projects. The consequences of poor project delivery include losses to company 
shareholders, insecurity of employment, delay in the provision of key services, and a 
cost to the world economy.  
To deal with the challenges of modern industrial projects, clients in this sector must 
consider adopting new processes. To help clients overcome barriers that are 
associated with adopting unfamiliar work processes, the academic community must 
provide guidance on how and when to use these new delivery methods.  
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1.7 Organization / Readers Guide 
This thesis is organized in a three-paper format. This thesis begins with an 
introductory chapter, followed by the three related papers, and ends with a concluding 
chapter. A summary of each chapter is given below. 
Chapter 1 informs the reader of the issues associated with the traditional design-bid-
build delivery method and establishes the need for this study. The chapter also details 
the three specific research problems, their methodologies, and the significance of this 
study. 
Chapter 2 presents the first paper. Paper one addresses what type of industrial project 
is a good candidate for collaborative delivery. Clients will find this paper useful prior 
to their decision to use a collaborative delivery method.  
Chapter 3 presents the second paper. This paper provides a detailed overview of the 
shared risk/reward commercial model and then explores the lessons from those who 
have implemented this complex commercial arrangement. Clients will find this paper 
useful once they have decided to go ahead with a collaborative delivery method and 
are in the stage of developing their contract. 
Chapter 4 presents the third paper. This paper develops a framework to compare the 
performance of an industrial project delivered under a collaborative delivery method 
to one delivered under a traditional delivery method. Clients will find this paper 
important once they have already decided to implement a collaborative delivery 
method.  
Chapter 5 presents the overall conclusions and limitations of this research. It also 
provides avenues for future research. 
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2. CHAPTER 2 – WHAT PROJECT IS A GOOD CANDIDATE FOR 
COLLABORATIVE PROJECT DELIVERY? 
2.1 Introduction 
It is widely recognized that selecting the appropriate project delivery method for a 
project is critical to promote good outcomes (DBIA, 2015; Department of Public 
Works, Queensland, 2008; NSW Department of Commerce, 2005). Some authors 
have claimed that careful project selection is the single most important decision when 
using collaborative delivery methods (DTF Victoria, 2006; Young et al., 2016). It is 
therefore in the interest of clients to understand what types of projects collaborative 
delivery methods will promote outcomes superior to those achieved through 
traditional delivery methods. Despite the importance of this decision, the current 
guidance on what projects suit collaborative delivery methods remains vague and 
unhelpful. Wood and Duffield (2009) summarize the current literature this way: 
“There is a plethora of selection guidelines on the use of the alliance delivery method 
that are inconsistent, confusing, do not reflect current practice, and are not focused on 
optimizing VfM [value for money]”. To help clients in the industrial sector maximize 
the probability of successful implementation of this delivery method, this research 
investigates what project characteristics suit collaborative project delivery. This 
research used a combination of semi-structured interviews and a web-based 
questionnaire to explore four key project characteristics. 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Alliancing Guidelines 
To better understand what types of projects are suitable for collaborative delivery 
methods, a range of government guidelines, white papers, books, and research articles 
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on alliancing were reviewed. Table 2-1 presents a summary of the discourse reviewed 
and presents the project characteristics that each document identified as being 
important for the consideration of alliancing. The list of characteristics is ordered 
from the most frequently cited to the least frequently cited. 
Table 2-1. Literature Review Summary of Project Characteristics that Suit 






























































































































Tight Timeframe X X X  X X X  X X X 9 
High Risk X X  X X  X X X  X 8 
Unclear / Broad Scope  X X  X X X X X X  8 
Difficult Stakeholder Challenges  X X  X X X X X  X 8 
High Complexity  X X X X  X  X X  7 
High Uncertainty    X X  X X    4 
Complex External Threats  X X    X X    4 
Brownfield Project   X   X    X X 4 
Need for Innovation    X  X   X   3 
High Project Value X   X   X     3 
Seeking Extraordinary 
Outcomes       X X    2 
High Profile Project       X     1 
 
The literature review revealed that the current guidance on what types of projects are 
suitable for alliancing is not well defined. Risk and complexity are of the most 
frequently cited characteristics, but each of these terms are complicated topics in their 
own right and lack clear definition. This makes it challenging for organizations that 
have not yet implemented this delivery method, because they are left wondering how 
much risk or how complex is enough to suit this new approach? There also appears to 
be a relationship between these characteristics but this relationship has not been 
clearly defined. Another issue with the current guidance is that various characteristics 
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appear to evaluate the project at different elevations. For example, complex 
stakeholder issues can be considered a specific risk event. So, how does this relate to 
the all-inclusive term “risk”? Questions like this have not yet been answered.  
2.2.2 IPD Guidelines 
Four leading IPD guidelines were reviewed for guidance on when to apply IPD (AIA, 
2007; Fischer et al., 2017; Kenig et al., 2010; Thomsen et al., 2016). Despite various 
authors identifying how important it is to apply collaborative delivery methods to the 
correct project, these readings offered no guidance on the types of projects IPD is 
appropriate for.  
2.3 Overall Methodology 
This study used a sequential exploratory research design to explore the types of 
projects that are suitable for collaborative project delivery methods. There were two 
primary data collection phases: Phase A, consisting of semi-structured interviews; and 
Phase B, consisting of a web-based questionnaire that was distributed to members of 
construction research institutions. A sequential exploratory design was utilized so that 
the concepts of risk, complexity, and project size could first be explored and 
understood prior to the development of the questionnaire. This study aimed to answer 
the following research question:  
What industrial projects are suitable for collaborative project delivery methods? 
2.4 Phase A: Qualitative Methodology 
Seven interviews were conducted with a mix of clients, consultants, and contractors to 
better conceptually understand what characteristics indicate a project is well suited for 
collaborative delivery methods. Participants were selected based on their seniority in 
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their respective organizations, as well as their experience with alliance projects. The 
interviews were semi-structured and asked for the participant’s thoughts on four 
characteristics and how they relate to a project’s suitability for collaborative delivery. 
The four characteristics that were explored were: risk, complexity, time frame, and 
project dollar value. The interview protocol can be found in Appendix B. Interviewees 
were located in Australia and New Zealand, and the interviews were conducted via 
Zoom. Each interview lasted between 45-60 minutes. Four of the participants were 
found through the researcher’s professional network; the other three came from 
referrals provided by the initial four interviewees. Descriptive information on the 
interview participants is provided in Table 2-2. 













Executed = 8 
Involved = 100+ 
Australia 
B 45 Consultant Principal 
Executed = 1 
Involved = 3 
New Zealand 
C 40 Client 
Regional Portfolio 
Manager 
Executed = 2 
Involved = 1 
New Zealand 




Executed = 1 
Involved = 5 
Australia 





Involved = 20+ 
Australia 
F 26 Contractor 
Operations 
Manager Executed = 1 New Zealand 
G 24 Client 
Regional Portfolio 
Manager Executed = 2 New Zealand 
 
2.5 Phase A: Qualitative Results and Discussion 
2.5.1 Risk 
When participants were asked how a project’s risk relates to its suitability for 
collaborative delivery, there was consensus among all seven interviewee’s that risk 
was the single most important variable. In fact, Participant C noted, “risk is the 
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characteristic that should determine the selection of any PDM”. This resounding 
agreement that risk is the critical factor for selecting a project for collaborative 
delivery is consistent with the existing literature on alliancing.  
Although interviewee’s reported risk as the primary driver for using a collaborative 
delivery method, risk is a term that is often used in a nebulous, catch all, manner. To 
provide definition to the concept of risk, interviewees were asked to explain their 
understanding of risk. To help organize the discussion, participants were presented 
two categories of risk as it is defined by the UK Association for Project Management. 
The UK Association for Project Management separates risk into “risk events” and 
“project risk” (Association for Project Management, 2012). Risk events are defined 
as: “an uncertain event or set of circumstances that, should it occur, will have an 
effect on achievement of one or more of the project's objectives”. Project risk is 
defined as: “the exposure of stakeholders to the consequences of variations in 
outcome”. Figure 2-1 was developed to help conceptualize the difference between 
these categories of risk.  
 
Figure 2-1. A visual representation of risk events and project risk. 
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The interviewees were presented the two categories of risk and asked if their 
conceptualization of risk related to risk events or project risk. All the participants 
indicated that they were referring to risk events. However, the participants reported 
that “risk” more specifically referred to the aggregate likelihood that a project would 
fail to meet its defined objectives, rather than a single risk event. This aggregate 
probability that outcomes would vary from their targets does not appear to have a 
formal name in risk management literature and among practitioners has assumed the 
name “risk”.  
Participant A suggested that this term “risk” would 
be more appropriately termed “uncertainty” because 
changes in outcomes can be both negative and 
positive. Participant A said, “The key to selecting 
the correct contracting strategy is to ask yourself 
how much don’t we [the client] know… in my opinion [a projects suitability for 
collaborative delivery] is a single dimension, and that is risk, or more precisely, 
uncertainty”. Participant G reinforced this concept of uncertainty by explaining that 
alliancing is suitable for projects “where we haven’t quite got everything sorted and 
we [the client] still need to get the project going”.  
Each interview participant was asked if there are risk events that create a high 
uncertainty project. Participant G identified stakeholder management as a critical risk 
that drove the decision to use an alliance on a $600 million dollar transportation 
development in New Zealand. The project stretched across 156 different landowners, 
and accommodating their needs into the execution of the project was of significant 
concern to the funding agency. Participant G noted that stakeholder management was 
the primary driver for another alliance project that consisted of installing a new 
“The key to selecting the correct 
contracting strategy is to ask 
yourself how much don’t we 
know… and that is risk, or more 
precisely, uncertainty” 
 
- Participant A 
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reticulated wastewater network to 950 private properties. Participant C discussed a 
$300 million transportation development in New Zealand that was delivered under the 
alliance model. This project required significant amounts of surcharge loading to 
consolidate the subgrade to acceptable levels of compaction. The time required to 
reach consolidation was the primary risk that drove the decision to use the alliance.  
Participant A has experience with hospital projects. 
Participant A said these projects are “ridiculously 
uncertain because it’s so hard to know what the 
stakeholders want. They will change their minds up 
to the last minute, and government will also make 
changes because there is a natural public interest to 
do so”. Participant A claimed that the source of 
uncertainty on hospital projects primarily comes 
from the difficulty of defining their specifications and design. Participant B, who also 
has experience with hospital projects, reinforced Participant A’s claims. Participant B 
said, “The complexity in hospitals is that all of the players want to have a say in the 
final design. The nurses all need to have a say, surgeons need a say, administrations 
need a say, the funders need a say, owners of the hospital management need a say 
because they are responsible for outcomes, and the maintenance team need a say”. 
Participant B gave an example of a recent $500 million hospital project where there 
were 23 stakeholder groups that had representatives provide input into the hospital’s 
conceptual design.   
The interviews revealed that projects with high uncertainty in their outcomes are good 
candidates for collaborative delivery. Interesting themes emerged regarding potential 
sources of this uncertainty. The interviewees had experience in two major 
“The complexity in hospitals is 
that all of the players want to 
have a say in the final design. 
The nurses all need to have a 
say, surgeons need a say, 
administrations need a say, the 
funders need a say, owners of 
the hospital management need a 
say because they are responsible 
for outcomes, and the 
maintenance team need a say.” 
 
- Participant B 
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construction industries: civil infrastructure, and hospital projects. For the civil 
infrastructure projects, the sources of uncertainty appeared to be associated with risk 
events that could occur after the project’s construction had begun. Uncertainty was 
introduced because risk events could manifest during execution that would impact the 
projects objectives. A common risk event that was identified was the management of 
stakeholders that would be impacted by the project, such as private landowners or the 
general public. It also appeared that the objective of this stakeholder management was 
to minimize the disruption to the stakeholders affected. In contrast, the primary 
sources of uncertainty for the hospital projects appeared to stem from the challenge of 
incorporating multiple conflicting stakeholder interests into the projects specifications 
and design. This can also be thought of as stakeholder management, but with the 
objective of maximizing the value of the project to each of the stakeholders. Figure 2-
2 provides a graphical representation of the different sources of uncertainty that 
emerged from the interviews. 
 

















In contrast to the current recommendations found in literature, each of the 
interviewees noted that complexity was not a good indicator of a project’s suitability 
for collaborative delivery. Participant C said, “I don’t think it is complexity, I think it 
is risk”. Similarly, Participant A said, “it’s not complexity, it is uncertainty”. It is 
unclear why literature refers to complexity so frequently regarding the application of 
collaborative delivery methods. A possible explanation for this is that uncertainty may 
be more challenging for practitioners to conceptualize than complexity, thus, people 
default to the term complexity. 
The interviewees made it clear that complexity and 
risk/uncertainty are concepts that can and should be 
separated. Participant C said: “You can have a very 
technically complex project with low risk, and you 
can have simple projects with high risk”. Participant C used the previously mentioned 
transportation alliance as an example. They stated that there was nothing complex 
about the surcharge loading, but there was very high uncertainty regarding the 
duration that would be required to reach an acceptable consolidation. Participants D 
and E also shared that they had delivered simple projects under alliances, and 
complex projects under traditional agreements.  
Although a clear separation between complexity and uncertainty was made, several 
participants identified that there is a relationship between the two. Participant C 
mentioned that there are situations where complexity can create uncertainty. They 
said, “If you have a technically complex problem plus a lack of time, then that 
“You can have a very 
technically complex project 
with low risk, and you can have 
simple projects with high risk” 
 
- Participant C 
25 
 
presents a risk and may make a case for sharing that risk”. Participant A also 
mentioned that there is a relationship between complexity and uncertainty.  
This finding supports the previous claim that the primary driver for using a 
collaborative delivery method is its risk/uncertainty. This also suggests that, in certain 
instances, a project’s complexity may create high levels of uncertainty, which would 
make it suitable for this form of delivery; however, simply because the project is 
technically complex, does not automatically qualify it for collaborative delivery.  
2.5.3 Tight Timeframe 
The most frequently cited characteristic in literature that makes a project suitable for 
collaborative delivery is one with a tight timeframe. During the interviews, 
participants were asked if collaborative delivery methods reduce project delivery 
time, and if that was a critical factor into their use of the delivery method. In contrast 
to expectations, the interviewees were not convinced that using collaborative delivery 
methods reduces overall project duration. Participant C disagreed that collaborative 
delivery methods reduce delivery time because, in their experience, the procurement 
time is significantly longer when employing this delivery method. This increase in 
procurement time was said to counter any savings that result from overlapping the 
design and construction phases. It is possible that this extended procurement duration 
is a result of comprehensive procurement policies in Participant C’s organization; 
however, Participants D and E reported similar doubt over a reduction in project 
duration from separate client organizations.  
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Participant A proposed that the reason why this 
criterion appears so frequently in literature is 
because there is a relationship between a 
project’s time constraints and its uncertainty. 
Participant A said, “Time and uncertainty are 
related in that, if you are in a rush, you haven’t had a chance to assess the situation 
and think it all through”. Participant A explained that the time constraint is less about 
reducing overall project duration and more about how quickly the project needs to get 
out to the market. The faster it needs to get to market, the more uncertainty you are 
likely to have. This could explain why the alliance delivery method has been adopted 
in New Zealand as an effective way to delivery disaster recovery work. It is very 
difficult to predict the extent of work required immediately following a natural 
disaster; therefore, there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with these projects. 
To summarize, the interviewees indicated that collaborative delivery methods are 
suitable for projects where there is urgency to begin the work, and that urgency 
creates high uncertainty regarding the outcomes of the project.    
2.5.4 Project Dollar Value 
The Australian Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development currently 
recommend alliancing only for projects that have project dollar value greater than $50 
million (AUD) (ADIRD, 2015). The interviewees were asked about their opinions on 
this minimum project value. Two conflicting opinions were presented. 
Four of the participants (A, B, D, and F) disagreed with the minimum project value. 
Participant D said that they had employed a collaborative contract on projects as low 
as $20 million (AUD), and thinks that the commercial model can be applied to 
“Time and uncertainty are related in 
that, if you are in a rush, you haven’t 
had a chance to assess the situation 
and think it all through” 
 
- Participant A 
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projects of any size. Participant A noted that, similarly to the time dimension, there is 
a relationship between a projects value and its uncertainty. Participant A asserted that 
project value is a tangible measure, unlike uncertainty, so it may simply be an 
objective proxy measure for uncertainty.  
Three reasons emerged why collaborative delivery methods should be limited to 
projects with high dollar value. The first reason relates to the cost of forming of a 
temporary organization. Participant C explained that there are costs with branding, 
temporary office space, coaches, team building events, vehicle branding, new 
business systems, etc., so the project needs to be of sufficient value to support these 
expenses. The second reason raised was that the ongoing project specific overhead 
costs are higher using this delivery method. In Participant G’s experience, these 
additional project overheads were a result of the additional staff required to run an 
alliance on a day-to-day basis. Additional staff included full accounting, 
administrative, and design teams, which are not usually present under traditional 
delivery models. The third reason identified is that the cost of procuring an alliance is 
expensive. Participant C explained that the cost to procure an alliance from a 
supplier’s perspective is significantly greater than under traditional models. For this 
reason, Participant C reasoned that clients should reserve collaborative delivery 
methods for projects with budgets to support the high procurement costs. 
The interviewees were divided on the need for a minimum project value for the use of 
collaborative delivery methods. An interesting observation was noted between those 
who were for and those who were against a minimum project value. Those who were 
in favor of a minimum project value consistently identified the cost of establishing 
and running a temporary organization as the reason why this delivery method should 
be reserved for projects with high project value. In contrast, the group who were 
28 
 
against the need for a minimum project value argued that the commercial terms could 
be implemented on a project of any size.  
This observation raises the question: what defines a collaborative delivery method? 
As mentioned in the introduction, collaborative delivery methods distinguish 
themselves from traditional delivery methods based on their agreements and 
commercial terms, but this observation suggests that there could be more to it than 
that. Yeung et al. (2007) proposed that the alliancing delivery method is defined by 
both “hard” factors and “soft” factors. The hard factors include a formal multi-party 
agreement and a shared risk/reward commercial model. The soft factors include 
common goals and objectives, a win-win philosophy, early selection of contractors, 
and agreed problem resolution methods, among others. The interviewees indicated 
that Yeung’s “hard” factors can be applied to a project of any size, but the use of the 
“soft” factors may be dependent on the size of the project. The interviewees 
specifically noted that the formation of a temporary organization would need to be 
reserved for projects with sufficient dollar value to support its procurement, 
formation, and operational costs.  
2.6 Phase B: Quantitative Methodology 
In a sequential exploratory study the quantitative phase is a follow up to the 
qualitative phase (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). In this study, the quantitative phase 
served to further explore four research questions. This section provides a review of 
the research questions, their associated hypotheses, and the development and 




The four research questions that were investigated through the web-based 
questionnaire are: 
Research Question 1: Is there a relationship between an industrial project’s risk 
and its suitability for collaborative project delivery? 
Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between an industrial project’s 
complexity and its suitability for collaborative project 
delivery? 
Research Question 3: Is there a relationship between an industrial project’s 
schedule challenge and its suitability for collaborative 
project delivery? 
Research Question 4: Is there a relationship between an industrial project’s dollar 
value and its suitability for collaborative project delivery 
methods? 
Based on the findings from the semi-structured interviewees, four hypotheses were 
developed about each of the four research questions. All the interviewees agreed that 
risk was the primary driver for using a collaborative project delivery method, 
therefore, the first hypothesis was: 
H1: Industrial projects with higher risk are more suitable for collaborative project 
delivery methods. 
In contrast to current guidelines the interviewees provided no indication that a 
project’s complexity is a good indicator of its suitability for collaborative delivery. 
The second hypothesis was: 
H2: There would be no relationship between an industrial project’s complexity and its 
suitability for collaborative project delivery methods. 
The interview participants revealed that a project’s pressure to begin the work would 




H3: Industrial projects with more challenging schedules are more suitable for 
collaborative project delivery methods. 
The interviewees gave indication that projects with higher dollar value were better 
suited to collaborative project delivery methods, therefore, the fourth hypothesis was: 
H4: Industrial projects with higher dollar value are more suitable for collaborative 
project delivery methods. 
Each hypothesis is based on the suitability of an industrial project for collaborative 
delivery. The Collaboration and Integration Index (C.I. Index) developed by CII’s 
RT-341 was adopted as a proxy measure of a project’s suitability for collaborative 
project delivery. The C.I. Index is a measure of the intensity and frequency of the 
collaboration and integration principles and methods used on a project (CII RT-341, 
2019). The principles are defined as principles that “align the interest and objectives 
of project stakeholders and to better share the gain/pain”, and the methods are defined 
as those that “help to enhance communication and teamwork among the project team 
members” (CII RT-341, 2019).  
2.6.2 Survey Development and Distribution 
Data to test each hypothesis was collected through a web-based questionnaire 
developed in Qualtrics. Members from CII’s research team RT-383 helped with the 
development and piloting of the questionnaire. This advisory group of practitioners 
consisted of 9 core members (4 client/owners, 1 contractor, 3 consultants, and 1 
supplier), who are hereinafter referred to as the “research team”. 
Prior to the development of the questionnaire, the research team met to review and 
update the collaboration and integration principles and methods used to develop the 
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C.I. Index. The final nine principles asked on the survey are shown in Table 2-3, and 
the final 21 methods are shown in Table 2-4. Definitions for the list of principles and 
methods can be found in Appendices C and D.  
Table 2-3. The 9 Collaboration and Integration Principles Measured on the 
Questionnaire. 
Collaboration and Integration Principles 
1. Continuous communication and issue 
resolution 
2. Financial transparency among key 
participants 
3. Jointly developed and validated targets 4. Shared risk and reward 
5. Access to shared information systems 6. Relational contracting (multi-party 
agreement) 
7. Early involvement of stakeholders 8. Negotiated risk distribution 




Table 2-4. The 21 Collaboration and Integration Methods Measured on the 
Questionnaire. 
Collaboration and Integration Methods 
1. Alternative scheduling method 2. Quality improvement process 
3. Co-location 4. Rapid process improvement workshops 
5. Constructability planning in the design 
phase 
6. Contract incentives 
7. Formal partnering / team building 8. Standardized design techniques 
9. Front end planning (FEP) 10. Design to cost (target value design) 
11. Joint risk assessment tool 12. Use of technology as an integration tool 
13. Multi-party agreement 14. Value engineering 
15. Multi-party project management team 16. Value stream mapping 
17. Mutual liability waivers 18. Advanced work packaging 
19. No dispute charter 20. A3 decision making 
21. Preassembly and modular construction  
 
The equation for calculating the C.I. Index is shown in Equation 1. 
𝐶. 𝐼. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =







𝑥 100 𝑥 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 − 1
4




𝑥 100 𝑥 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 − 1
4
 𝑥 100  
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The questionnaire adopted a similar overall design to that used by CII’s research team 
RT341, in that respondents were asked to identify a project that demonstrated high 
levels of collaboration and integration (CII RT-341, 2019). The questionnaire first 
asked for demographic information from the respondent, and the remainder of the 
questionnaire collected information about the identified project. The collected data 
was reviewed in Excel for inconsistencies and then input into SPSS for analysis.  
Two pilot tests were completed to ensure that the questions were written in a way that 
would transfer the desired intent to the respondent, and to test for the required time to 
complete the survey. The initial pilot revealed that the survey required too much time 
to complete and various questions were rearranged into matrix tables. The 
reformatting of questions reduced the survey time, meaning that no questions needed 
to be removed. The research team members also requested additional definition to be 
provided with each question. This feedback was received through Zoom review 
sessions.  
The questionnaire was distributed to CII member companies, to PTAG’s partner 
companies, to CURT’s member companies, and through the professional networks of 
the research team members. The questionnaire was originally distributed on 
November 16, 2020, with a planned duration of two weeks, but due to low response 
rates was left open until January 28, 2021. The analyses performed in this paper 
includes data collected up to January 28, 2021, but the research team decided to keep 
the survey open to continue collecting responses past this date. The operationalization 




2.6.3 Operational Definitions 
Risk / Uncertainty 
The interviewee’s revealed that uncertainty and risk are terms that are often conflated, 
and that, while uncertainty is the real construct, the term “risk” tends to resonate 
better with practitioners. Accordingly, the questionnaire was developed to collect data 
on the level of risk on the identified project. Risk was defined as: the likelihood that 
the project will fail to meet its objectives. Respondents were asked to rate the level of 
risk from very low to very high (1 - 5) for each of the risk categories shown in Table 
2-5. A Risk Index was calculated as the average of the 10 risk categories. Examples of 
specific risk events that could occur within each category was included as an 
attachment for the respondents, see Appendix E.  
Table 2-5. The 10 Risk Categories Measured on the Questionnaire. 
Risk Categories 
1. Funding 2. Environmental 
3. Geotechnical and Subsurface 4. Scope Change 
5. Design 6. Political and Community 
7. Weather 8. Land Acquisition 
9. Construction 10. Organizational 
 
Complexity 
CII’s research team RT-305 investigated and developed a tool to measure the 
complexity of an industrial project. However, their team approached complexity from 
a management perspective, rather than a characteristic of the project. They state, “the 
research team chose not to describe complexity primarily in terms of a project’s 
physical features… but rather to describe complexity related to managing projects” 
(CII RT-305, 2016). The selection of a delivery method should be based on a project’s 
characteristics; therefore, the research team deemed that RT-305’s complexity 
indicators were not suitable for this study. Instead, Wood and Ashton’s operational 
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and technological complexity scale was adopted for this study (Wood & Ashton, 
2010). The final items included in the complexity scale are shown in Table 2-6, and 
each item was asked in comparison to a typical project, ranging from much less to 
much more complex (1 – 5). A Complexity Index was generated by averaging the 10 
items. 
Table 2-6. The 10 Complexity Items Measured on the Questionnaire. 
Complexity Items 
1. Value of the project 2. Overall complexity of the project's 
design / engineering systems 
3. Number of the stakeholders 4. Complexity of the project's 
construction methods 
5. Need for end user input into the design 
/ engineering options 
6. The systems and equipment used on 
this project were cutting edge 
7. Technical knowledge required to 
complete the design / engineering 
8. The systems and equipment on the 
project were highly interrelated 
9. Amount of mechanical and electrical 
work 
10. The review of the project's systems and 
equipment was complicated and 
involved many stakeholders 
 
Schedule Challenge 
The third hypothesis investigated the relationship between how challenging a 
project’s schedule is, with how suitable it is for collaborative delivery. Respondents 
were asked how challenging the projects schedule targets were compared to a typical 
project, and this was measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from much less 
challenging to much more challenging (1 – 7). 
Project Value 
Each respondent was asked to provide the dollar value of their identified project. This 
value was used to test the fourth hypothesis. 
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2.7 Phase B: Quantitative Results and Discussion 
2.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
A total of 49 completed questionnaires were received. Figure 2-3 presents the 
distribution of responses received from clients, contractors, engineers/designers, and 
other organizations, and the split of responses that were received from public and 
private representatives. 
 
Figure 2-3. Survey response breakdown by organization and type of funding. 
The number of projects identified from each industry sector, as defined by CII, and 
the project’s type of funding is shown in Figure 2-4. CII’s project sector breakdown is 
provided in Appendix F. Figure 2-5 shows the distribution of the value and duration 
of the identified projects. 
 




































Figure 2-5. Distribution of the value and duration of the identified projects. 
2.7.2 Risk / Uncertainty 
For each of the 49 identified projects, a Risk Index was calculated based on the 10 
items defined in Section 2.6.3 (Mean = 2.845, Std = 0.612). Cronbach’s alpha was 
used to evaluate the internal consistency of this index, which was .821, exceeding the 
standard of .70 suggested by Nunnally (1978) for exploratory research. Figure 2-6 




Figure 2-6. Relationship between the Risk Index and C.I. Index. 
Visually, there appears to be a relationship between the level of risk of an industrial 
project, and the amount of C.I. methods and principles being used. Pearson’s 
correlation test was conducted to test this relationship. Table 2-7 shows that there was 
a significant linear relationship between a projects risk and its C.I. Index, r(47) = .318, 
p = .026, providing support for the first hypothesis. 
Table 2-7. Pearson Correlation of Risk and C.I. Index. 
Variable Mean Std N Correlation P-value 
Risk Index 2.845 .612 49 0.318 0.026 
C.I Index 19.880 19.574 49   
 
Figure 2-7 shows that industrial projects with medium-high risk (>3) appear to have 
higher variation in the number of C.I. methods they are willing to employ. The 
variability in the number of C.I methods and principles used can be represented by the 
standard deviation. The standard deviation in the C.I. Index for projects that had risk 
index greater than 3.0 was 23.4, and the standard deviation for those projects with risk 

































difference in this statistic shows that projects with high risk are using a much wider 
range of C.I. methods and principles than those with low risk.  
 
Figure 2-7. Comparing the standard deviation of projects with low risk to those with 
high risk. 
While a significant relationship was found, the degree of association between the 
variables is low to moderate. Figure 2-8 shows that there is a group of projects with 
high risk but low C.I. Index. A plausible explanation for why these projects did not 
employ more collaborative practices is that their organizations were not experienced 
with the implementation those practices. Additionally, using CI methods and 
principles can be viewed as its own risk to an organization that is not experienced 
with their implementation. Organizations may therefore choose to avoid adopting new 
practices on projects that are already high in risk as a means to protect themselves 
from the inherent risk of the project. Doing things, “the way they have always been 
done”, acts as a risk mitigation strategy because the organization is familiar with the 
























Figure 2-8. Identifying projects with high risk and low C.I. Index 
2.7.3 Complexity 
For each of the 49 identified projects, a Complexity Index was calculated based on the 
10 items defined in Section 2.6.3 (Mean = 3.582, Std = 0.566). Cronbach’s alpha was 
used to evaluate the internal consistency of this index, which was .815, exceeding the 
standard of .70 set forth by Nunnally (1978). The Complexity Index and the C.I. 
Index were plotted in Figure 2-9, and visually indicate that there is no relationship 
between an industrial project’s complexity and its C.I. Index. 
 






































Low C.I. Index 
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To test the second hypothesis a Pearson’s correlation was conducted between the 
Complexity Index and the C.I. Index. Table 2-8 presents the results of this correlation 
test. This statistical test reveals that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that 
there is a significant relationship between a projects complexity and its C.I. Index, 
r(47) = .162, p = .265, which supports the second hypothesis. 
Table 2-8. Pearson Correlation between Complexity Index and C.I. Index. 
Variable Mean Std N Correlation P-value 
Complexity Index 3.582 0.566 49 0.162 .265 
C.I Index 19.880 19.574 49   
 
2.7.4 Schedule Challenge 
The third hypothesis investigated if there is a relationship between how challenging 
an industrial project’s schedule is and the number of C.I. methods and principles used. 
Figure 2-10 plots the level of challenge of the projects schedule compared with a 
typical project (x-axis) against the C.I. Index (y-axis).  
 


















How Challenging the Project's Schedule was Compared to a Typical Project
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Due to the ordinal nature of the schedule compression variable, a Spearman’s 
correlation was conducted to test the rank order relationship between the two 
variables. Table 2-9 presents the results of this analysis. The Spearman’s correlation 
reveals that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a significant 
relationship between how challenging the projects schedule was and its C.I Index, 
rs(47) = -0.010, p = .945. 
Table 2-9. Spearman Correlation between Schedule Challenge and C.I. Index. 
Variable Mean Std N Correlation P-value 
Schedule Challenge 5.306 1.158 49 -0.010 0.945 
C.I Index 19.880 19.574 49   
 
2.7.5 Project Dollar Value 
The fourth hypothesis investigated if there is a relationship between a project’s dollar 
value and the number of C.I methods and principles used. The value of the projects 
identified by respondents were highly positively skewed (3.056), therefore the project 
value variable was log transformed to meet the normality assumptions that are 
necessary when testing for bivariate association (Kowalski, 1972). Figure 2-11 shows 
a plot of the log transformed project value (x-axis) with the C.I. Index (y-axis).  
 






















Pearson’s correlation test was conducted to test the fourth hypothesis. Table 2-10 
shows that there was a significant linear relationship between the log of the project 
value and its C.I. Index, r(45) = .325, p = .026. This relationship can be interpreted as 
follows: as the value of an industrial project increases in order of magnitude, there is a 
linear increase in the number of C.I. methods and principles used.  
Table 2-10. Pearson Correlation between Project Value and C.I. Index. 
Variable Mean Std N Correlation P-value 
Log(Project Value) 8.087 1.132 47 0.325 0.026 
C.I Index 19.880 19.574 49   
 
2.8 Overall Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to understand what type of industrial projects would be 
good candidates for collaborative delivery methods. This study used semi-structured 
interviews with Project Alliance expects from Australia and New Zealand followed 
by a survey of members from the industrial sector to explore how four project 
characteristics influence a projects suitability for collaborative delivery.  
The main contribution of this study is that it identifies that a project’s risk, or more 
precisely, the uncertainty of its outcomes, is the primary driver for using a 
collaborative project delivery method. This finding was found unanimously 
throughout the series of interviews and then supported quantitatively through a web-
based questionnaire. This finding brings clarity to the existing literature on the types 
of projects that collaborative delivery methods are suitable for. This knowledge will 
help support future research on the application of collaborative delivery methods, 




Because this delivery method is suitable for projects that contain high levels of 
risk/uncertainty, clients may be hesitant to implement a new practice to these types of 
projects. Implementing an unfamiliar delivery method to projects with high levels of 
risk/uncertainty may be viewed as taking a “leap of faith”. The web-based 
questionnaire revealed that there are still many industrial projects that contain high 
levels of risk/uncertainty but do not employ many collaborative practices. This may 
stem from the belief that implementing new practices introduces its own risk; 
therefore, many organizations default to what they are used to, and what they are 
comfortable with. The reality is that continuing with existing practices contains the 
risk of producing the same substandard project outcomes that the industry is currently 
producing. Collaborative delivery methods provide clients with an opportunity to 
change this, but one of the barriers that has yet to be discussed it that these delivery 
methods are suitable for projects that clients are simply not willing to experiment on.  
Complexity is frequently discussed in alliancing guidelines as a good indicator for 
collaborative delivery. In contrast to the recommendations from literature, the 
interviewees suggested that complexity was not a good indicator for collaborative 
delivery. The quantitative findings provided support for the claims made by the 
interview participants in that no relationship was found between an industrial 
project’s complexity and the amount of collaboration and integration methods and 
principles that were used.  
The most frequently cited characteristic for using a collaborative delivery method is a 
project with tight time constraints, but little definition has been provided on this 
characteristic. The interview participants suggested that collaborative delivery 
methods are good candidates for projects that need to begin work as soon as possible. 
The interviewee’s related this characteristic to uncertainty, as projects that need to go 
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to market sooner will have less time for planning and thus more uncertainty. The 
quantitative phase of this study was unable to find a relationship between how 
challenging an industrial project’s schedule was, and how many collaborative 
practices they employed.  
Although the quantitative results of this study were not able to support the findings 
from the qualitative phase, this variable should not be discarded from future research. 
The frequency in which this variable appears in literature suggests that it is an 
important characteristic and should not be neglected. It is possible the subjective 
operationalization of this variable introduced error into the quantitative analysis, 
potentially confounding the results.  
A minimum project value for collaborative delivery appears to be common policy 
among government agencies in New Zealand and Australia. The Australian 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development guidelines recommend that 
alliancing be reserved for projects larger than $ 50 million (AUD) (ADIRD, 2015). 
The interview participants were divided on whether a minimum project value was 
necessary to deliver a project under a collaborative delivery method. Part of the 
disagreement appeared to stem from the participants having different opinions on 
what constitutes a collaborative delivery method. Further research is required on 
whether collaborative delivery methods require a minimum project value. 
To date, there have been no studies that have compared the distribution of costs 
between a collaboratively delivered project and a project delivered under traditional 
models. Such a study could identify how and where the costs differ between the two 
delivery methods and this could help to answer questions relating to a minimum 




Prior to this effort, little work has been conducted on understanding what type of 
project is suitable for collaborative project delivery. The major contribution of this 
study is uncovering that a projects risk, or more precisely, a project with high 
uncertainty of its outcomes, is the fundamental driver for using a collaborative 
delivery method. Additionally, in contrast with current guidance, this study found no 
evidence to support that a project’s technical complexity is a good indicator of its 
suitability for collaborative project delivery. These findings will help clients in the 
industrial sector with identifying projects that will have the greatest probability of 




3. CHAPTER 3 – LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT THE SHARED RISK / 
REWARD COMMERCIAL MODEL 
3.1 Introduction 
One important feature that separates a collaborative delivery method from other 
traditional delivery methods are its commercial terms (ADIRD, 2015; DTF Victoria, 
2006). These commercial terms, often referred to as the “shared risk/reward” 
agreement, are a fundamentally new way for clients to engage with their engineering 
and construction service providers. The shared risk/reward model separates profit and 
overheads from direct project costs, and shifts the basis of profit from an individual’s 
performance to the overall project’s performance, providing stakeholders with a 
monetary incentive to collaborate (AIA, 2009) 
The shared risk/reward agreement is considerably more complex than traditional 
agreements, and since its appearance in the late 90’s, little research has been 
completed to understand the effectiveness and practical implications of each 
component in this agreement. The Construction Management Association of America 
(CMAA) developed an owner’s guide to project delivery methods. In this guide they 
state that one of the disadvantages of IPD is “agreement on the criteria and the final 
IPD contract can be very difficult and can take an inordinate amount of time and 
effort, for which the owner may be paying, if not in money then in time” (CMAA, 
2012). 
The objective of this paper is to help reduce the time needed for clients in the 
industrial sector to familiarize themselves with these new commercial terms. This is 
achieved by first providing a detailed review of the commercial model, and then semi-
structured interviews with practitioners are used to provide lessons learned on the use 
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of the shared risk/reward commercial model. The lessons captured will help clients in 
the industrial sector understand these complex commercial terms and will help them 
develop their own shared risk/reward models for collaboratively delivered projects. 
3.2 Overview of the Shared Risk/Reward Model 
This paper first provides a detailed overview of the shared risk/reward commercial 
model to familiarize the reader with the structure of the commercial terms. The shared 
risk/reward model is employed on both IPD and alliancing project delivery methods 
and presents an elegant way to prevent the issues of misalignment and fragmentation 
caused by traditional commercial models. Two extracts from IPD and alliancing 
guidelines presented in Table 3-1 demonstrate that, conceptually, the two commercial 
models strive to achieve the same objective; that is, to remunerate non-owner 
participants (NOPs) for their direct costs, and to tie their profit to the client’s 
evaluation of project success.  
Table 3-1. Comparing Extracts from Alliancing and IPD Commercial Models. 
IPD Commercial Model 
 
(Fischer et al., 2017) 
Alliancing Commercial Model 
 
(ADIRD, 2015) 
“All or part of the participants’ profit is 
placed at risk and profit may be augmented 
if project performance is met or exceeded. 
Individual profit is not a function of the 
amount of work performed, or of individual 
productivity, but is proportionate to overall 
project success.” 
“Under the Risk or Reward Regime, the 
NOPs agree to put all (or a certain 
percentage) of their Corporate Overhead 
and Profit at risk, tied to their performance 
against the TOC [target outturn cost] and 
other non-price project objectives.” 
 
The objective of the shared risk/reward model is to create a situation where all parties 
share in the benefit of a successful project, and equally, share in the pain from a 
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poorly delivered project. The intent of the shared risk/reward model is shown in 
Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1. Objective of the shared risk/reward commercial model (Ross, 1999). 
This win:win, lose:lose proposition is achieved by tying the profit of the NOPs to the 
performance of the project (Fischer et al., 2017). In turn, this creates a “best for 
project” mind set, rather than the “best for myself” mind set found in traditional 
models (Kenig et al., 2010). Tying the profit of NOPs to the performance of the 
project, rather than their individual scopes of work, actually provides NOPs with a 
monetary incentive to collaborate (AIA, 2009), whereas in traditional models, 
collaboration is expected simply out of goodwill. Additionally, expanding the 
definition of performance from just cost metrics gives clients an opportunity to 
incentivize their non-financial project outcomes, avoiding the misalignment of 
interests described in the introduction.  
Although the alliancing and IPD extracts show that both the commercial models strive 
to align the compensation of the service providers with the performance of the project, 
there is a notable difference in the amount of literature that exists on how each 
delivery method achieves that goal. Literature on IPD and how profit should be tied to 
performance is light; in fact, most sources do not provide practical guidance on how 
to implement this principle. Conversely, alliancing guidelines have created a clear and 
consistent structure on how to do this. This is possibly because IPD has been adopted 
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by private clients in the healthcare industry, whereas alliancing has primarily been 
used by public agencies and as such, has had formal procurement guidelines 
developed. 
Considering that both IPD and alliancing seek to achieve the same objective, and also 
considering that the existing literature on the alliance commercial model is more 
comprehensive, this paper adopts the terminology and structure of the alliance 
commercial model. 
The shared risk/reward commercial model utilized on alliance contracts is often 
characterised as a “3-limb model” (ADIRD, 2015; DTF Victoria, 2006; Gransberg et 
al., 2015; Ross, 2001). Under the 3-limb model, each NOP that is a signatory to the 
agreement will be compensated as follows: 
Limb 1: Reimbursed for the actual direct cost of the work (including rework 
and wasted effort) and project-specific overheads. 
Limb 2: A fee to cover profit and non-project-specific (corporate) overheads. 
Limb 3: An increase or reduction in compensation dependent on the overall 
performance of the project. 




Figure 3-2. The 3-limb commercial model (DTF Victoria, 2006). 
3.2.1 Limb 1 and Limb 2 
What separates the shared risk / reward model from other commercial models is the 
Limb 3 component. The Limb 3 component enables clients to adjust their NOPs profit 
based on the performance of the project. For this reason, this study focuses on 
capturing lessons learned specifically relating to the Limb 3 incentive mechanism. For 
principles and recommendations on the development of the Limb 1 and Limb 2 
components, readers should refer to (DTF Victoria, 2006) and (ADIRD, 2015). 
3.2.2 Limb 3 
The Limb 3 mechanism is the key mechanism that incentivizes exceptional 
performance in cost and non-cost areas (ADIRD, 2015). The Limb 3 component 
incentivizes NOPs to achieve exceptional performance in Key Result Areas (KRAs) 
by adjusting their profit through two mechanisms: the cost performance mechanism, 
and the non-cost performance mechanism. 
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Cost Performance Mechanism 
The cost performance mechanism incentivizes NOPs to achieve the client’s cost 
targets by sharing in any cost underruns and cost overruns (ADIRD, 2015; DTF 
Victoria, 2006; Ross, 2003). This is often referred to as “pain/gain sharing”, and the 
client and the NOPs typically share pain/gain at a 50:50 split. The potential downside, 
“pain”, for the NOPs is usually capped at their total limb 2 fee, after which the client 
will absorb any further cost overruns. A graphic representation of how the cost 
performance mechanism functions is presented in Figure 3-3.  
 
Figure 3-3. Typical cost performance mechanism. 
Non-Cost Performance Mechanism 
The non-cost performance mechanism enables clients to incentivize their NOPs to 
achieve their non-financial objectives. The non-financial objectives are incentivized 
by the Overall Performance Score (OPS). The OPS is a weighted score of the NOPs 
performance in various non-cost KRAs. The non-cost KRA scores are also calculated 
as a weighted score of their respective Key Performance Indicator (KPI) scores. The 
























representation of the relationship between the three scores is shown in Figure 3-4. The 
KPI scores are calculated based on an agreed relationship between a specific KPI and 
its KPI score. Figure 3-4 shows that this relationship does not need to be linear and 
will need to be negotiated between the client and their NOPs. The agreed relationship 
between a KPI and its KPI score should be designed so that a score of 100 should 
indicate exceptional performance, and a score of -100 should represent substandard 
performance.  
 
Figure 3-4. Relationship between the KPIs, KRAs, and OPS. 
Figure 3-5 provides an example of a schedule KPI. The schedule KPI may relate the 
days over/under the target schedule to a KPI score. An agreement between the client 
and NOPs will need to occur to set how many days over/under schedule will 
constitute exceptional and substandard performance. Figure 3-5 shows an example of 




Figure 3-5. Example relationship between schedule KPI and KPI score. 
Based on the OPS score, clients can use one or both of the following mechanisms to 
incentivize the achievement of their non-cost KRAs. 
1. KRA Pool: The OPS score can be linked to a pool of funds (KRA Pool) 
that the owner will pay to the NOPs in the case of exceptional performance 
(OPS > 0), or the NOPs will refund the owners for substandard performance 
(OPS < 0). If the OPS exceeds zero, the owner will make an extra payment to 
the NOPs based on a linear scale up to an agreed maximum value. If the OPS 
is less than zero, the NOPs will refund the owner based on a linear scale up to 
an agreed maximum. A graphic representation of the KRA Pool mechanism is 
presented in Figure 3-6. Note, the KRA Pool maximum and minimum values 
do not need to be equal. 
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2. Pain/Gain Modifier: The OPS score can also be linked to adjust the cost 
over/underrun sharing ratio. In the instance of good performance in the non-
cost KRAs (OPS > 0), NOPs can increase their share of underruns or decrease 
their allocation of overruns. Alternatively, in the case of poor non-cost 
performance (OPS < 0), NOPs will reduce their share of underruns and 
increase their allocation of overruns. The Department of Treasury and Finance 
of Victoria suggests the OPS score should adjust the cost over/underrun 
sharing agreement by +/- 20% (DTF Victoria, 2006). A graphic example of a 
+/-20% pain/gain modifier is presented in Figure 3-7. 
 
Figure 3-7. +/- 20% Pain/Gain modifier example. 
Limb 3 Summary 
The previous section has shown that there are various mechanisms that clients can use 
to tie compensation to project performance. Figure 3-8 was developed to help 


























Figure 3-8. Visualization of the different incentive mechanisms in the Limb 3 
component. 
3.3 Methodology 
Creswell and Poth (2018) explain that, “we conduct qualitative research because a 
problem or issue needs to be explored… we also conduct qualitative research because 
we need a complex, detailed understanding of the issue. This detail can only be 
established by talking directly with people”. The objective of this paper is to explore 
the lessons from practitioners on the components of the shared risk/reward 
commercial terms. This objective is exploratory by nature and a qualitative 
methodology was deemed most appropriate to capture the nuances associated with 
this topic. Another motivating factor for using a qualitative approach is that it allows 
for clarification of questions to ensure the participants fully understand the questions 
being asked. This is particularly important when discussing these detailed commercial 
terms. The qualitative approach enabled the researcher to provide real time 
clarification of the questions which would not have been available through more 
traditional quantitative approaches. 
Data for this paper was collected through seven semi-structured interviews. Data 
collection for this paper was coordinated with the qualitative data collection of 
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Chapter 2. For information about the interview participants and the population 
sampling procedure, see Section 2.4. Following the questions asked in relation to 
Chapter 2, the interviewees were asked specific questions about the shared 
risk/reward commercial model. The Limb 3 component of the shared risk/reward 
model was separated into two mechanisms: the cost performance mechanism, and the 
non-cost performance mechanism. For each mechanism, participants were asked if 
they thought it was beneficial to project outcomes and if there is anything that they 
would change in future agreements. Participants were also questioned on how they 
decided what parties would be included in the agreement. For the interview protocol, 
see Appendix B. 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
The objective of the interviews was to capture lessons about each component in the 
shared risk/reward commercial model. The findings are organized and presented by 
those related to the cost performance mechanism, the non-cost performance 
mechanism, and deciding who to include in the agreement. 
3.4.1 Cost Performance Mechanism 
Pain/Gain Sharing 
All seven interviewees indicated that the pain/gain mechanism was the most 
important part of the commercial terms and the driver of different behavior. 
Participant G noted, “I think it’s very critical. If you do not have that, you are not 
going to drive any change in behaviors because, at the end of the day, it is still a 
commercial arrangement. It is still a contract, and the objective of the NOPs is to 
make money”. This finding is consistent with the results of Love et al, who also 
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reported that the “share in the profit/loss was a driving factor for collaborative 
behavior and achieving cost efficiencies” (Love et al., 2011).  
The participants also appeared to believe that the pain/gain sharing mechanism was 
more influential than the non-cost mechanism. Most interviewees supported the use of 
the non-cost KPIs, but they were described as a nice to have and not essential. 
Participant C said, “They [non-cost KPIs] are important, and we want them, but they 
are more in the nice to have category”. Participant C also said, “I think the price 
mechanism [pain/gain mechanism] is definitely the big thing, because that allows you 
to build the project”.  
NOP Risk Cap 
The interviewees were asked for their opinion on the NOP risk cap. Participant D 
reported that while there can be good reason to implement this mechanism, it has its 
drawbacks. Participant D explained, “With caps, there is no incentive once the 
threshold is reached”. If a project enters painshare (limb 2 is totally exhausted), then a 
contractor can become unmotivated to perform. Participant D reported that in an 
alliance that was performing poorly, there was high turnover of key personnel from 
the contractor’s organization, making the project come to a halt. This concern was 
shared by Participants C and G, who also mentioned that they had experienced an 
alliance where most, or all, of the limb 2 fee was lost, and that created situations 
where the contractor lost motivation. And once that happened the client really begun 
to suffer. 
The interviewees revealed that capping the downside risk of NOPs can compound a 
client’s risk if the project becomes distressed. Not only must they absorb all cost 
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overruns after the Limb 2 fee is exhausted, but they will need to absorb the losses 
associated with the contractor losing interest in the project. 
When asked what they would do differently, Participant D proposed, “rather than 
having caps, perhaps risk and profit should be shared 50/50 to a point and then apply 
a diminished risk and profit share”. For example, clients and NOPs could share 
pain/gain at a 50:50 split up to the Limb 2 fee, and any further pain/gain could be split 
85:15 between the client and NOPs, respectively. Figure 3-9 depicts the proposed 
model. Participant C, another client representative, was presented this alternative 
model. Participant C indicated that, while this had never been discussed, it made good 
logical sense to have the same sharing relationship between the gain and pain sides. 
Participant C did raise a concern about this proposed model, saying, “as soon as you 
put the direct cost of the NOPs at risk, they will build contingency into their limb 1 
fee”. This is a fair critique of the alternative pain/gain sharing model and shows that 
decisions relating to the risk cap mechanism require a trade-off. 
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One of the criticisms of the shared risk / reward commercial model is that it 
incentivizes parties to inflate their target cost (Henneveld, 2006; Thomsen et al., 
2016; P. Wood & Duffield, 2009). Another attractive quality of the proposed model 
for sharing cost over/underruns is that the higher percentage of retained savings for 
the owner would protect them from cases where the target cost was excessively 
inflated.  
3.4.2 Non-Cost Performance Mechanism 
KPIs 
Interviewees were asked if there was anything they would change about the non-cost 
KPIs that were included in their contracts. Participants B and G explained that their 
non-cost KPIs actually did change during the course of their projects’ execution. 
Participants B and G revealed that their contracts contained provisions that enabled 
the KPIs to be reviewed. Participant G reported that they were involved in an alliance 
were the KPIs were reviewed every six months, and the alliance management team 
had the opportunity to change the KPIs. Participant G revealed that the management 
team did change KPIs some of the KPIs because the original KPIs were not providing 
proper representation of the performance of the project. In other words, the OPS 
indicated the project was more successful that what the management team believed, 
and the provision enabled them to fix that. 
KRA Pool 
All seven participants stated that there was a minimum KRA Pool value that was 
needed to incentivize the NOPs to pursue them. However, no participant could 
identify a policy or rule of thumb for what this minimum should be. Participant C 
said, “It has to be a meaningful amount of money, otherwise they [the NOPs] will not 
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put any effort into achieving it”. In the study by Love et al. (2011), they observed that 
alliance KRA Pools ranged from 0.55 – 3.6% of the total project value. 
Participant C noted, in their experience, the KRA pool usually is limited by political 
reasons. Participant C reported that, in an alliance that is about to be tendered, local 
Politian’s view the KRA Pool as a completion bonus, and do not support the KRA 
Pool. Participant C suggested that a client could ask themselves, “How much can you 
include in the KRA pool and reasonably justify, then take a critical look at whether 
that amount would incentivize you to chase it”. It was also recommended that clients 
use the tendering period to directly ask the NOPs if the value of the KRA Pool is 
sufficient to encourage them to pursue those outcomes.  
3.4.3 Who to Include in the Agreement 
Case studies on IPD projects have revealed that a wide range of parties have been 
included in the shared risk/reward commercial agreements (Cheng & Johnson, 2016). 
Some involve only the client, the prime contractor, and a prime architect/engineer; 
others include each of those as well as several key suppliers. The interviewees were 
asked what parties they viewed as being critical to include in the agreement. 
Participant D said, “You must consider which participants have an interest in the risks 
and the ability to influence outcomes”. This sentiment was echoed by all participants, 
suggesting that it would change for every project. 
Three of the Participants (C, F, and G) reinforced the importance of this issue by 
presenting cases where the exclusion of key contractors or suppliers from the 
agreement led to poor project outcomes. Participant F gave an example of a steel 
supplier who was not included in the commercial terms and indicated this was a 
mistake because the steel work ended up delaying the overall project. Had their profit 
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been at risk of the overall project, Participant F contended that they would have given 
the project more attention.  
Participant G also gave an example of an alliance where the earthworks subcontractor 
was not included in the main alliance agreement. Instead, the prime contractor entered 
into a sub-alliance agreement with the earthwork subcontractor. A sub-alliance 
agreement contains many of the same provisions as a main alliance but is between a 
main alliance participant and one of their sub-contractors, and only for a specific 
scope of work. Participant G believed that the decision to use a sub-alliance was the 
leading reason why the project failed to meet both time and cost targets. They 
explained that the sub-alliance caused the culture to effectively revert to the 
fragmented and self-interested environment found on traditional contracts. This was 
because the sub-alliance contractor’s compensation was no longer tied to the overall 
project’s performance; instead, their compensation was in relation to the completion 
of their specific scope of work. This reportedly reduced their willingness to 
collaborate with other parties, and this unwillingness greatly impacted other critical 
parts of the project, extending the project’s completion date by over 25%. Figure 3-10 




Figure 3-10. Depiction of sub-alliance contractor unwilling to collaborate with other 
subcontractors. 
When asked how a client should determine who to include in a collaborative 
agreement, none of the interviewees could identify a formal process. Participant G 
noted that there is an important difference depending on how the project is tendered. 
Under a non-price model, the client selects which contractor and engineer to engage 
with. In this case, the client has full control over which parties to include in the 
agreement and needs to use their best judgement. In contrast, under a competitive 
model, the client releases an RFQ/RFP, and a consortium of contractors and engineers 
respond to that RFQ/RFP. Under the competitive model, the client leaves the decision 
of who to include in the shared risk/reward agreement up to the organization leading 
the consortium.  
This distinction is important because Participant G suggested that clients who 
competitively tender their collaborative agreements are leaving the critical decision of 
who to include in the agreement up to another party. As described above, failing to 
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include key contractors and suppliers has led to poor outcomes, so it should be in a 
client’s interest, regardless of tendering method, to have a say in who is part of the 
agreement. 
3.5  Conclusions 
The shared risk/reward commercial terms are complex, and it is challenging for 
clients to understand the implications of each of its components. To address this issue, 
this paper explored lessons from clients that currently implement these unique 
commercial terms. The key lessons learned include the following: 
1. The pain/gain sharing mechanism is the primary driver of more collaborative 
behavior. The non-cost KRAs are “nice to have” but are less influential than 
the pain/gain mechanism. 
2. If a project enters painshare and the risk cap threshold is reached, the 
contractor may lose motivation to perform. Clients may want to consider 
alternative risk capping arrangements to ensure contractors will remain 
engaged regardless of the state of the project. 
3. Contract provisions that enable management to review KPIs are an effective 
approach to ensure that the KPIs reward the project team for above average 
performance. 
4. A minimum KRA Pool is necessary to incentivize the project team to pursue 
those non-cost outcomes. 
5. Excluding key contractors or suppliers from the commercial agreement can 
result in poor project outcomes. 
6. Using sub-alliances may lead to traditional fragmented and adversarial 
behavior between the sub-alliance contractor and other project participants. 
Further investigation is required on the performance of sub-alliances. 
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4. CHAPTER 4 – FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF 
COLLABORATIVELY DELIVERED INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS 
4.1 Introduction 
As clients in the industrial sector begin adopting collaborative delivery methods there 
will be a need to evaluate if this delivery method provides superior outcomes to 
projects executed under traditional delivery methods. Currently, there are no 
frameworks that compare the performance of industrial projects that are executed 
under different delivery methods. The objective of this research is to develop a Project 
Success Framework (PSF) that will enable clients in the industrial sector to 
benchmark the performance of their traditional projects and make more informed 
decisions about the effectiveness of collaborative delivery methods in this sector. 
Additionally, as shown in Chapter 3, the shared risk/reward commercial agreement 
uses non-cost KPIs to measure and incentivize performance. To achieve optimal 
performance of collaboratively delivered projects, it is important for project teams to 
clearly define, measure, and assess important performance outcomes. The PSF 
developed through this study is aimed to inform industrial project practitioners of 
metrics that can be used to incentivize high performance. 
4.2 Background on Project Success 
This problem is a subset of the topic of project success and how it should be 
measured. Bannerman (2008), Müller and Jugdev (2012), and Soon Han et al. (2011), 
have all identified that there are two distinct streams of research on project success: 
project success criteria, and project success factors. Project success criteria is research 
on how the success of a project is evaluated. Specifically, this refers to the 
information required to evaluate if a project was, or was not, successful. The second 
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stream of research relates to factors that affect the success of a project. This stream of 
research focuses on understanding why two different projects may have been 
delivered with different levels of success. The objective of this paper is to develop a 
framework to evaluate the success of an industrial project, so this literature review 
focuses on the first stream of research. The literature review begins with a review of 
the conceptual models of projects success and is followed by a review of the 
pragmatic approaches that have been taken to evaluate the success of construction 
projects. 
4.2.1 Conceptual Models of Project Success 
It would be difficult to find an article on the project success that does not mention 
cost, time and quality criteria. Most authors, including, but not limited to, Al-Tmeemy 
et al. (2011), Atkinson (1999), Baccarini (1999), Chan (2001), Lim and Mohamed 
(1999), Müller and Jugdev (2012), Pinto and Slevin (1988), each refer to these three 
criteria as fundamental to the evaluation of a project’s success. These three criteria 
have become so deeply engrained in the understanding of project success that 
Atkinson coined them the “iron triangle”. However, Atkinson suggests that the “iron 
triangle” is not wrong, but incomplete, and he suggests that reducing success to these 
three measures is akin to a Type 2 error. Atkinson presented his own interpretation of 
project success which consisted of two dimensions: the delivery stage, and the post-
delivery stage. The deliver stage dimension relates to the traditional outcomes of 
meeting cost, time, and quality targets. The post-delivery stage dimension relates to 
providing benefit to the project stakeholders, ensuring users are satisfied with the 
product, and ensuring the outcome meets the needs of the customer. 
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Pinto and Slevin’s seminal work on project success has helped people understand the 
importance of being able to evaluate a project’s success (Pinto & Slevin, 1988). They 
explain that a project manager’s bonuses, promotions, and overall career are often 
dictated by how “successful” they are in delivering of projects. Pinto and Slevin 
developed a conceptual model of project that success that had two primary 
dimensions: the project and the client. The project dimension relates to the project 
meeting cost, time, and quality targets. The client dimension relates to whether the 
project works and addresses a problem, to the satisfaction of the products users, and to 
whether the project will lead to more effective decision making. 
Shenhar (1997) proposed that project success must be perceived in relation to four 
hierarchical dimensions. Dimension 1, Project Efficiency, relates to the traditional 
three criteria of success, cost, time, and quality. Dimension 2, Impact on the 
Customer, relates to the need for projects to serve their original purpose. Dimension 3, 
Business and Direct Success, relates to whether the project achieved its strategic 
goals. Dimension 4, Preparing for the Future, relates to how the project helped its 
organization prepare for future opportunities.  
Lim and Mohamed (1999) proposed a conceptual model of project success for 
construction projects. They separated project success into a micro and macro 
viewpoint. The micro viewpoint is concerned with the results of the construction 
project at the end of the construction phase such as cost, time, quality, and safety. The 
macro viewpoint relates to whether or not the project fulfilled the needs of the user or 
stakeholders. 
Baccarini (1999) separates project success into project management success and 
product success. Under Baccarini’s model, project management success relates to the 
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project meeting its budget, schedule, quality. In a similar fashion to Lim and 
Mohammad’s macro viewpoint, and Shenhar’s business success dimension, 
Baccarini’s product success relates to the extent to which the project satisficed the 
stakeholders needs and achieved its original purpose.  
Each of the conceptual models of project success were summarized based on the 
outcomes that they deemed were necessary to achieve on a successful project. Table 
4-1 presents this summary. 



































Met cost objectives x x x x x 
Met schedule objectives x x x x x 
Met functional and technical requirements x x x x x 
Provided benefit to project stakeholders x x x x  
Users are satisfied with the product x x  x x 
Project outcome meets needs of the customer x x   x 
Project increased organizational capability   x   
Project led to more effective decision making  x    
Project was delivered safely    x  
 
Bannerman (2008) explains that one of the challenges in determining if a project is 
successful is that one must first decide if a project is a means to an end, or if it is an 
end in itself. If a project is assumed to be a means to an end, then its performance 
should reflect how well the project achieved its strategic goals and how well it met its 
end user’s needs. Alternatively, if the project is considered an end, then its success 
can be determined at its closeout stage based on traditional characteristics such as 
time, cost, and quality. Bannerman suggests that a project fits into one category or the 
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other. However, the previously detailed frameworks from Baccarini, Lim and 
Mohamed, Shenhar, and Atkinson, each suggest that a successful project is one that is 
successful as an end itself, as well as a means to other strategic and client ends.  
4.2.2 Pragmatic Approaches 
The aforementioned conceptual models provide insights to the range of outcomes that 
a project must achieve to be an overall success. However, each of them fails to 
provide measurement of the key project outcomes. Cost and time are usually defined 
as whether or not the project met its budgeted cost or planned duration, but the other 
criteria, such as the benefit to project stakeholders, are often provided with no specific 
measurable item. Other researchers have taken more pragmatic approaches to the 
measurement of a construction projects success. These are discussed below. 
The KPI Working Group (2007) provides a two-step framework for measuring the 
success of a civil construction project. The two-step framework consists of Key 
Result Areas (KRAs), which are key outcomes that a project must achieve, as well as 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which are specific measurable outcomes that are 
used to evaluate the performance in each KRA. The KPI Working Group provides six 
KRAs that define the success of civil infrastructure projects. The six KRAs and their 
definitions are shown in Table 4-2. 
The KPI Working Group provides a range of KPIs that are used to measure each of 
the KRAs. The KPIs and their method of measurement can be found in Appendix G. 
Franz (2014) also used a two-step framework to defined the success of building 
projects. He defined success using cost, schedule, and quality KRAs, and provided 
specific KPIs to measure each of them. Franz’s KPIs are shown in Appendix G. 
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Table 4-2. The KPI Working Group’s KRAs and their Definitions. 
KRAs Definition 
Client Satisfaction 
Measures how satisfied the client was with the quality of the finished product 
and the service (of the whole project team). 
Usually measured at or shortly after completion and handover 
Defects 
Measures the degree to which the completed facility was free from defects 
that impacted on the client. Usually measured at the point the project is 
offered for handover. 
Cost Measures how well out-turn costs compared with original estimates. 
Time Measures how closely the project was delivered to the original timetable 
Safety 
A measure of the number of Lost Time Incidents per 200,000 hours worked. 
Equivalent to 100 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) employees. 
Profitability Measures company profit before tax and interest as a percentage of sales. 
 
El Asmar et al. (2016) developed the “project quarterback rating” (PQR) to represent 
the success of building projects. The PQR is an aggregated performance index from a 
linear weighted sum of KPIs and KRAs. The PQR consists of seven KRAs and 
multiple KPIs within each KRA. The model of the PQR is shown in Appendix G. 
The Construction Industry Institute (CII) is a center for research and development for 
best practices in the capital projects industry. Several of CII’s research teams have 
developed performance frameworks to validate their tools and findings. CII’s Pre-
Project Planning Research Team (RT-039) developed a success index that was a 
linear weighted sum of two KRAs and four KPIs (CII RT-039, 1994). RT-039’s 
success index is shown in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3. RT-039’s Project Success Index. 
KRA KPI Measurement 
Project Success 
Budget Achievement 








Design Capacity Attained 










4.3 Overall Methodology 
This research used a sequential exploratory mixed method design to build and validate 
the PSF for industrial projects. This methodology was chosen for several reasons. 
First, the concept of project success is a complex phenomenon, and the exploration of 
complex phenomena is well suited to qualitative methods (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2018). Second, survey dominant research methods have several drawbacks in 
construction research, such as low response rates, long response times, and long 
development periods (Gibson & Whittington, 2010). 
The PSF for industrial projects was developed through two phases. Phase A consisted 
of a research charrette that was used to develop the structure of the PSF. In Phase B, a 
focused survey was developed and used to validate the PSF framework. The details of 
each phase are provided below. 
Throughout the course of this study, CII’s research team RT-383 helped to guide the 
direction of this research. This advisory group of practitioners consisted of 9 core 
members (4 client/owners, 1 contractor, 3 consultants, and 1 supplier), who are 
hereinafter referred to as the “research team”. The knowledge of the research team 
was leveraged for the development of the framework, and the research team members 
were critical in the distribution and completion of the targeted survey. 
4.3.1 Phase A: Research Charrette 
An increasingly common research method in construction research in the structured 
workshop or “research charrette” (Gibson & Whittington, 2010). According to Gibson 
and Whittington (2010), research charrettes are an effective exploratory technique as 
they combine the best tenets of surveys, interviews, and focus groups in an 
accelerated time frame. Research charrettes have also been successfully used in a 
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variety of other exploratory construction studies, including Esmaeili et al.’s (2013) 
study of project success for building projects, and in the development of the PDRI for 
building projects (Cho & Gibson, 2000). For these reasons, a research charrette was 
deemed an effective approach to exploring the complex and multidimensional topic of 
evaluating the success of an industrial project. 
As Gibson and Whittington explain, the construction industry typically does not 
permit probabilistic sampling because it is logistically impossible to define a sample 
frame. Therefore, the purposive sample of participants for the research charrette 
consisted of the research team members, as well as other industrial sector senior 
managers that were invited by the chair of RT-383’s research team. There were 12 
total participants, with 5 client representatives, 4 consultants, and 3 academics. 
On June 18, 2019, a three-hour long research charrette was held to develop the KRAs 
and KPIs which would form the PSF. The research charrette was held in Lincoln, 
Nebraska. Participants were first refreshed on the objective of the workshop and the 
relationship between the KRAs, KPIs, and project success. CII’s RT-341 completed a 
literature review to identify common Key Result Areas (KRAs) that have been used to 
define the success of construction projects (CII RT-341, 2019). This work was used as 
the starting point for the group discussion and participants were given a printed list of 
the 14 KRAs identified by RT-341. Each KRA was discussed as it relates to the 
evaluation of the success of an industrial project. A group consensus was required to 
include any of the KRAs in the final framework. To help participants conceptualize 
the KRAs, they were given the following instruction: 
“If you were an owner and had to demonstrate that project A was more successful 
than project B, what are the areas that you would discuss?” 
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After the KRA task was completed, the group discussed KPIs that are representative 
of each of the KRAs. To help facilitate the discussion, each participant was given a 
list of KPIs that have previously been used to measure success on research projects. 
The participants of the research charrette were instructed that the KPIs must be 
measurable and accessible across all types of industrial projects. Similarly to the 
KRAs, a consensus among the group was required to include any KPI in the final 
framework. Notes were taken during the charrette, and then the framework was 
created in a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet. Once the spreadsheet was finalized it was 
distributed to the research team for review.  
4.3.2 Phase B: Validation Survey 
To validate the relationship between the KPIs and KRAs, and to ensure these metrics 
are measurable across different projects, a targeted survey was developed. This survey 
asked respondents to categorize each KPI into one of the KRAs. If the KPI is 
categorized with the same KRA that was developed during the research charrette, 
there would be good indication that the KPI is representative of that key area of 
project success. A web-based questionnaire was developed in Qualtrics, and each 
member of the research team was instructed to send it to 10 people in their 
professional network. Definitions of each KPI and KRA were provided to respondents 
as downloadable pdfs to assist with their response. To mitigate the effects of order 
bias, the list of KPIs were randomly displayed to each participant.  
4.4 Results 
The objective of this paper was to develop a framework that would allow clients in 
the industrial sector to compare the performance of a collaboratively delivered 
project, with a project that was delivered under traditional delivery methods. The 
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results from the research charrette are provided first, and then the results of the 
targeted survey are presented. 
4.4.1 Qualitative Research Charrette Results 
The first objective of the research charrette was to finalize a comprehensive list of 
KRAs that can be used to compare the success of an industrial project executed under 
different delivery methods. Figure 4-1 shows the 11 KRAs that participants from the 
research charrette decided would be important to compare.  
 
Figure 4-1. The 11 KRAs that shape the success of industrial projects. 
Definitions for each of the final 11 KRAs developed during the research charrette are 









This construct represents a measure of how competitively the project was 
priced compared to the typical market conditions at the time the project 
was delivered. The objective of this KRA can be thought of as capturing 
the “value for money” that the owner receives. 
Cost Certainty 
Cost certainty represents a measure of how well the project’s actual costs 
met the project’s early cost targets. 
Schedule 
Competitiveness 
Schedule competitiveness is a measure of how competitively the project’s 
schedule was compared to typical market conditions at the time the 
project was delivered. 
Schedule Certainty 
Schedule certainty represents a measure of how well the project’s actual 
schedule met the project’s early schedule targets. 
Quality 
Quality represents a measure of how well the project’s products and 
services complied with its plans and specifications. This is not to be 
confused with the quality of the finishes used on the project. 
Safety 
Safety represents a measure of the frequency of recordable safety 
incidents that occurred on the project. 
Project Functional 
Objectives 
A projects functional objectives is a measure of how well the project 
achieved the client’s functional objectives as defined in the client’s 
business case that was used to justify the project’s funding. 
Project Financial 
Objectives 
Financial objectives is a measure of how well the project achieved the 
financial objectives of all of the major participants in the project 
(typically the client, contractor, and engineer). 
External Stakeholder 
Impacts 
External stakeholder impacts is a measure of how much the execution of 
the project impacted external stakeholders. External stakeholders can 




Environmental impacts is a measure of the frequency and magnitude of 
recordable environmental events that occurred on the project. 
Change Management 
The change management construct represents a measure of the frequency, 
size, and duration of changes that occurred on the project. 
 
Client satisfaction was one of the 14 KRAs that was discussed by the team during the 
research charrette, but in contrast to popular trends in project success literature, was 




“if we delivered a project and it met all of the other KRAs, our organization would 
continue to do business with that service provider, regardless of our personal 
relationship” 
There was consensus among the participants on this perspective. The group argued 
that, if a project met all of the other KRAs, then their clients would be satisfied and 
this would be redundant, so this KRA was removed from the final framework.  
After the KRAs were finalized, the group identified KPIs that would be representative 
of the high order KRAs. The original list of KPIs developed during the research 
charrette is shown in Appendix H. 
4.4.2 Validation of the KPIs 
To validate that the KPIs are representative of their higher order KRA, a targeted 
survey was distributed to professionals in the industrial sector asking them to 
categorize each KPI into its respective KRA. After data cleaning, a total of 41 
responses were received. The respondents’ average number of years of experience 
was 21.5 years, with a standard deviation of 11.3 years. The sample population 
represented 21 clients, 10 contractors, and 10 engineers/consultants. 32 respondents 
primarily worked in the heavy industrial sector, 5 in the light industrial sector, 4 in 
power, utilities and infrastructure, and one in the building sector.   
Each respondent was asked to categorize the list of KPIs into one of the 11 KRAs. 
Table 4-5 presents each KPI, the KRA it was categorized into during the research 
charrette (expected), and the KRA that was categorized most frequently in the 
targeted survey. Table 4-5 also indicates if there was a match between the expected 
and found KRA categorization.  
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Table 4-5. KPI Categorization from the Targeted Survey. 





Contingency Index Cost Competitiveness Cost Certainty 
Cost Efficiency Cost Competitiveness Cost Competitiveness 
Direct Work Rate Cost Competitiveness - 
Productivity Cost Competitiveness Cost Competitiveness 
Contingency Used % Cost Certainty Cost Certainty 
Cost Variation Cost Certainty Cost Certainty 
Buffer Index Schedule Competitiveness Schedule Certainty 
Time per Unit Schedule Competitiveness Schedule Competitiveness 
Schedule Variation Schedule Certainty Schedule Certainty 
Construction Defects Quality Quality 
Design Defects Quality Quality 





Commissioning Time Quality Schedule Certainty 
DART Rate Safety Safety 
TRIR Safety Safety 











Project Financial Objectives Project Financial Objectives 

Complaints External Stakeholder Impact External Stakeholder Impact 
External Stakeholder 
Impact 
External Stakeholder Impact External Stakeholder Impact 






Change Cost Index Change Management Cost Certainty 
Change Time Index Change Management Change Management 
Non-owner Initiated 
Changes 
Change Management Change Management 

Owner Initiated Changes Change Management Change Management 
Speed of Change 
Approval 
Change Management Change Management 

 
Two of the KPIs (direct work rate and notice of violation) were categorized as “not 
important” by more than 15% of the respondents. Upon recommendations from the 




The final PSF for industrial projects is presented in Table 4-6.  
Table 4-6. Project Success Framework for Industrial Projects. 











Cost Certainty Cost Variation 





















∑ 𝑁 𝑥 𝑤
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
 𝑥 200,000 
Design defects 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
 
Construction defects # 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
NCRs # 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 
Commissioning duration 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Safety 
TRIR 
# 𝑂𝑆𝐻𝐴 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠









1-7 Likert scale: This project achieved all of the functional objectives as 





1-7 Likert scale: This project achieved its financial objectives 
Contractor Financial 
Objective Realization 




Complaints # 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 
External stakeholder 
impact 






# 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
Change 
Management 
Change cost index 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
 
Change time index 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
# Non-owner changes # 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
# Owner Initiated 
changes 
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 / 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Speed of Change 
Approval 
Average duration that RFIs are open in weeks 
aThe capacity of the facility should be a comparable industry metric for the facility (e.g. kWh, tonnes per day, bpd, etc. 
bThe total project budget must include project contingency and be adjusted for scope changes.  




The objective of this paper was to develop a framework that can evaluate the 
effectiveness of collaborative project delivery methods for industrial projects. 11 
KRAs were defined as essential outcomes that can be used to define the success of an 
industrial project. Specific KPIs were also identified that can be used to consistently 
measure the performance of a project in each of the 11 KRAs. The PSF was designed 
to be flexible, so the KPIs that measure each KRA can change, enabling clients to 
replace them with metrics that are important to their specific project, sector, or 
business.  
The KPIs also provide a specific way for clients to develop their non-cost incentive 
mechanisms in the shared risk/reward commercial model. One of the time-consuming 
activities associated with developing a collaborative contract is to identify suitable 
metrics to incentivize performance. The PSF provides clients with a “menu” of KPIs 
that can be used to develop these agreements.  
4.5.1 Discussion of the KRAs 
Two dimensions have consistently emerged from existing conceptual models of 
project success. The first dimension pertains to the success of the management of the 
project against predetermined targets: usually regarding cost, time, and quality. These 
outcomes can be evaluated immediately after the conclusion of the project. In 
Baccarini’s terms, this is “project management success”. The second dimension of 
success relates to how well the project fulfils the client’s original need for the project. 
This type of success must be evaluated at some time after the delivery of the project 
and is referred to as “product success”.  
79 
 
The 11 KRAs presented in the PSF can be separated into the project management and 
product success dimensions. The PSF contains 9 KRAs that relate to project 
management success and 2 KRAs that relates to product success, see Figure 4-2.  
 
Figure 4-2. PSF KRAs separated into project management and product success 
dimensions. 
As Figure 4-2 shows, the PSF places greater emphasis on outcomes in the project 
management dimension of overall project success. The PSF was developed with the 
purpose of comparing the success of projects delivered under different delivery 
methods. This indicates that project delivery methods have a greater influence over 
project management outcomes, rather than how well a project achieves its client’s 
organizational needs. This makes intuitive sense, as a project delivery method is, in 
essence, the process by which a client realizes a project, not a way for clients to 
identify projects that will fulfil their organizational needs.  
Baccarini states that a project’s product success will trump its project management 
success (Baccarini, 1999). In practical terms, this means that projects that meet all 
their cost, schedule, and quality targets may still be considered a failure if they fail to 
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meet their client’s long term organizational needs. Therefore, clients may be inclined 
to evaluate the performance of a delivery method based on a project’s product 
success. Doing so would be a mistake, as the delivery method has limited influence 
over the project product success. This shows that clients need to consciously separate 
project management and product outcomes when evaluating the performance of a 
delivery method, and as Figure 4-2 shows, comparing delivery methods should focus 
on comparing project management outcomes. 
The PSF presents an alternative approach for evaluating a project’s cost and schedule 
performance. Typically, cost and schedule performance relate to a project’s adherence 
to its target budget and target finish date. This success framework separates cost and 
schedule into their respective competitiveness and certainty. Practitioners provided 
this recommendation because they said a project’s adherence to its targets is largely 
dictated by how competitive those targets are. For example, a project could be 
significantly under budget because of an inflated target budget. By separating a 
project’s cost certainty from its cost competitiveness, clients gain a better 
understanding of how successful their project was. 
Another reason for separating cost and schedule certainty from competitiveness is 
because it addresses an important criticism of collaborative delivery models. Under 
the shared risk/reward commercial model, non-owner parties share in the underruns of 
the project. This creates an implicit incentive to inflate the target cost (Henneveld, 
2006; Thomsen, Darrington, Dunne, & Lichtig, 2016; Wood & Duffield, 2009). By 
separating cost certainty from cost competitiveness, clients can increase their 
visibility of the performance of a project and properly evaluate the effectiveness of 
the delivery method.   
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4.5.2 Discussion of the KPIs 
The value of any comparison is dependent on the quality of information inputted into 
the analysis. One of the issues present with existing project success frameworks is that 
there is a lack of detailed instruction provided with their KPIs. For example, the 
traditional cost variation KPI is present in many existing project success frameworks 
(Chan, 2001; El Asmar et al., 2013, 2016; Franz, 2014; Hanna, 2016; KPI Working 
Group, 2007). In these frameworks, the cost variation KPI is typically defined as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
 
The issue with this formula is that it does not inform the individual providing 
information on how to handle project change orders. Changes are a part of 
construction and will appear on every project. Changes will occur for a number of 
reasons, including differing ground conditions, inaccurate specifications, owner-
initiated design changes, or errors and omissions in the drawings. The initial budget in 
this formula needs to reflect the cost of changes on the project. CII separates changes 
into two categories: project development changes and scope changes. Project 
development changes are defined as: “changes required to execute the original scope 
of work or obtain original process basis”. Scope changes are defined as: “changes in 
the base scope of work or process basis”. The PSF requires individuals to correct the 
initial budget for scope changes but not project development related changes. Doing 
so will better reflect the performance of the project team without distorting the cost 
information because of changes. Additionally, this will ensure that the project 
information being collected is consistent and thus will improve the accuracy of 
comparisons that can be generated from the framework. 
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The financial profitability indicator has been used a variety of existing frameworks; 
however, its previous appearances usually only refer to the profitability of the client 
(Chan, 2001; Nassar & AbouRizk, 2014). The PSF includes a KPI for the financial 
performance of the contractor. This indicator helps to identify if a project was more 
competitive because the work was delivered more efficiently, or if it was simply the 
result of contractors reducing their profit margins.  
4.5.3 Implications for Practitioners and Researchers 
The benefits of the PSF are threefold. As intended, it provides clients with a 
comprehensive list of KRAs and KPIs to compare the performance of a 
collaboratively delivered project with one that is delivered under traditional methods. 
This will enable clients to accurately evaluate the effectiveness of collaborative 
delivery methods for industrial projects.  
The PSF will also enable clients to make more informed decisions about the 
application of all project delivery methods. Several efforts have been made to develop 
project delivery method selection tools, such as the CIIs “Project Delivery and 
Contracting Strategy” tool, and the United States Federal Highway “Contracting 
Alternatives Suitability Evaluator”, but these tools continue to rely on judgement and 
subjectivity to make their evaluations. The PSF provides clients with a structured 
approach to evaluating the performance of their projects, and its adoption could help 
to create a database used to inform future delivery method selection tools based on 
sound empirical data, rather than subjective opinions.   
Third, the PSF provides clients with a “menu” of KPIs that they can use to develop 
their shared risk/reward commercial models. Collaborative delivery methods provide 
clients with an opportunity to incentivize the achievement of their non-financial 
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objectives through KPIs. However, it can be challenging to measure performance in 
outcomes other than cost. The PSF provides clients with a range of KPIs as well as 
the KRA that they will each incentivize. This will help reduce the time spent 
negotiating the metrics within the commercial model and ensure that their commercial 
models incentivize behavior that promotes project success. 
4.6 Conclusions 
Collaborative project delivery methods are an outcome focused delivery method is 
being adopted with the intent to deliver high risk industrial projects more effectively. 
This paper developed and validated a Project Success Framework that will allow 
researchers and practitioners to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of collaborative 
delivery methods on important project outcomes for industrial capital projects. This 
PSF also provides a structured approach to compare the performance of any project 
delivery method across a varied spectrum of projects. Its adoption will enable 
organizations to develop more accurate project delivery method selection tools that 
use empirical evidence to determine when each delivery method would promote the 
optimal results. Lastly, this framework will help clients develop their shared 






5. CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Collaborative delivery methods present a fundamentally new way for clients to 
deliver capital projects, and their recorded success on civil and healthcare projects has 
gathered the attention of the industrial sector. Prior research has found strong interest 
within the industrial sector for using a delivery system that is more collaborative and 
that aligns the commercial outcomes of all the participants (CII RT-271, 2012). To 
address this demand, this thesis provides three papers that each address an issue with 
the adoption of collaborative delivery methods in the industrial sector. In combination 
these papers will facilitate with the industrial sectors inevitable transition to 
collaborative delivery of their capital projects. The conclusions from each paper are 
presented below.  
5.1 Conclusions 
Existing knowledge on the types of projects that suit collaborative delivery methods 
lack definition and consistency. Chapter 2 brought much needed clarity to the body of 
knowledge on this topic. Interviews revealed that projects with high uncertainty in 
their outcomes are best suited for collaborative delivery. This was validated through a 
web-based questionnaire of industrial projects which found that projects with greater 
risk were employing more C.I. methods and principles. This understanding will help 
clients in the industrial sector identify projects that will have the greatest likelihood of 
being successful under this new delivery method.  
Chapter 2 also found evidence to suggest that, unlike current guidelines recommend, a 
project’s complexity is not a good indicator of its suitability for collaborative 
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delivery. The web-based questionnaire also revealed that industrial projects with 
higher dollar value employ more collaborative and integrated practices.   
Chapter 3 presented a detailed overview of the shared risk/reward commercial model 
and explored the lessons learned about each of its components. The findings of the 
interviews revealed several lessons that will help clients in the industrial sector 
understand the implications of these commercial terms and help them to develop their 
own commercial agreements.  
The adoption of collaborative project delivery methods in the industrial sector 
remains low, but there is significant interest to move in a more collaborative direction.  
As clients begin to experiment, there will be a need to evaluate the performance of 
projects delivered under collaborative systems to those delivered under traditional 
systems. Without the ability to make this comparison, there will be no compelling 
evidence to drive change throughout the sector. Chapter 4 addresses this need by 
developing a project success framework that gives clients a structured approach to 
comparing the performance of their industrial projects delivered under different 
delivery methods.  
The project success framework identified the following 11 Key Result Areas that 
clients should evaluate when comparing the performance of projects delivered under 
different delivery methods: 
1. Cost Certainty 2. Project Functional Objectives 
3. Cost Competitiveness 4. Project Financial Objectives 
5. Schedule Certainty 6. External Stakeholder Impact 
7. Schedule Competitiveness 8. Environmental Impacts 
9. Quality 10. Change Management 




In addition to the KRAs, Chapter 4 presents a list of KPIs that can be used by clients 
to develop their shared risk/reward commercial model. This list of KPIs will ensure 
that clients are incentivizing behavior that supports their desired outcomes.  
5.2 Limitations 
The findings of this study are subject to several limitations. Those limitations include 
the following: 
 In Chapter 2, no relationship was found between complexity or schedule 
compression and the number of C.I. methods and principles on industrial 
projects. It is possible that the operationalization of these variables introduced 
error into the analysis and confounded the results.  
 The sample size of the semi structured interviews used in Chapter 3 was 
limited. However, the population of projects delivered under collaborative 
delivery methods is small, and the population of senior management that are 
familiar with the commercial terms is even smaller. Additionally, this sample 
size was similar to other construction management research where the 
population investigated is small (Beckman-Cross, 2016; Love et al., 2011). 
 In Chapter 3, there was also no representation of practitioners that had 
experience with the IPD delivery method in the sample of interviewees. 
Collaborative delivery methods encompass the IPD delivery method and 
including a participant with IPD experience would have provided a more 
complete perspective. 
 The project success framework was developed with the intent of being 
applicable to all industrial projects. There may be limitations to this 
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generalizability because the group of professionals used to develop the project 
success framework may not have been representative of the entire industrial 
sector. Additionally, there was no representation of contractors during the 
development of this framework. With that being said, contractors were part of 
the targeted survey which validated the framework, mitigating this limitation.  
5.3 Directions for Future Research 
The findings of Chapter 2 revealed that projects with high uncertainty in their 
outcomes are good candidates for collaborative delivery methods. Currently, there is 
no consistent approach to evaluate a project’s uncertainty. Future research should 
develop a reliable measure of this variable because it will enable clients to 
consistently evaluate their projects suitability for collaborative project delivery. 
Interviewees suggested that the source of uncertainty differs between projects in the 
civil and healthcare industries. Future research should compare the different sources 
of uncertainty between these industries as it could help to explain differences found 
between the IPD and alliancing agreements. Such a finding could help inform the 
optimal structure of collaborative agreements in the industrial sector. 
This research was unable to conclude a minimum project value needed to support 
collaborative project delivery methods. One avenue for future research would be to 
compare how the costs vary between projects delivered with collaborative delivery 
methods to those delivered under traditional delivery methods. This may be able to 
reveal the cost of setting up and running a collaboratively delivered project and could 
help determine if a minimum project value is needed to support this delivery method. 
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A lesson learned identified in Chapter 3 was that the use of a sub-alliance was a 
leading reason for the failure of one alliance in New Zealand. More research is needed 
to inform project teams on the implications of entering a sub-alliance agreement.  
Once the industrial sector has increased its adoption of collaborative delivery methods 
there will be a need to research and publish the performance of these delivery 
methods as they compare to traditional delivery methods, as this will help with the 
widespread adoption of this new delivery system. The project success framework can 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Hello, my name is Xavier Wood, and I am a master’s student at the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln. Thank you for taking the time to talk to me today about your 
experience with Alliancing. If there is any question that you do not feel comfortable 
answering, or that does not apply to you, just let me know, and we will move on.  
As this is a research project, we do require you to provide informed consent. [Give 
them the informed consent form.] This form includes information about the project 
overall, potential risks, and rewards, and what will be done with the data. [Go over 
each section, if needed.] We plan to record this interview, for later transcription and 
analysis, so there is also a permission to record checkbox.  
Do you have any questions for me? 
1. Participant Information 
a. How many years’ experience do you have in your industry?  
b. How many alliance projects have you executed / worked with? 
c. What is the role of your organization? 
d. What is your position in your organization? 
2. This section seeks to understand what type of project would be a good 
candidate for collaborative project delivery. Four variables are discussed. 
a. Risk 
i. Literature often states that alliancing is good for projects with 
high risk 
ii. Do you agree? 
iii. If yes, what exactly is meant by the term risk? 
iv. [Present risk events and project risk concept] Does your 
conceptualization of risk relate to risk events or project risk? 
v. Are there specific risks that lend toward collaborative delivery? 
b. Complexity 
i. Literature often states that alliancing is good for projects that 
are highly complex 
ii. Do you agree? 
iii. If yes, what exactly do you mean by complexity? 
c. Tight time frame 
i. Literature often states that alliancing is good for projects with 
tight time frames 
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ii. Do you agree? 
iii. Can you describe how alliancing reduces overall project 
delivery duration? 
d. Project Value 
i. Alliancing guidelines often recommend that this delivery 
method is reserved for projects over $100M.  
ii. Do you agree? 
iii. If yes, why must projects have a minimum value? 
3. This section seeks to understand your experience with the shared risk/reward 
commercial model. Questions are asked about each component in the 
commercial model. 
a. Pain/gain 
i. Was the pain/gain mechanism a primary driver of different 
behavior? 
ii. How did the pain/gain compare to the non-cost KPIs in terms 
of how they changed behavior? 
iii. Is there anything you would change with the pain/gain 
mechanism? 
b. NOP risk cap 
i. What are your thoughts on capping NOPS downside risk? 
ii. Is there anything you would change with the NOP risk cap 
mechanism? 
c. KPIs 
i. Would you change any of the non-cost KPIs used on alliance 
projects you have been involved with? 
d. KRA Pool 
i. Is there a minimum value needed to incentivize NOPs to pursue 
the KRA pool? 
e. Who to include in the agreement 
i. What parties should be included in the shared risk/reward 
agreement? 
ii. How should a client decide which parties to include? 
 
4. Do you know of any other individuals that would be willing to speak with me 
about their experience on the alliance delivery method? 
 




APPENDIX C. C.I. PRINCIPLES DEFINITIONS 




A set of procedures that aims for the team parties to communicate 
throughout the entire project and consists of identifying and resolving 
issues, action planning, and follow-up agreements. 
Jointly developed 
and validated targets 
A process that aims for the members on the project team to define and 
confirm project targets and objectives throughout the term of the project. 
Access to shared 
information systems 
A system setup to allow for sharing of project information such as 
documents and models. 
Early involvement of 
stakeholders 
A process that allows key parties such as the owner, contractor, engineer(s), 
and major subs to be present and involved from the earliest design phases 




A process that aims for all members on the project team to collaborate on 





An agreement where financial information such as the project budget is 
shared among key project participants. 
Shared risk and 
reward 
A process that allows for team members to combine the risk and rewards of 





An agreement where there is one contract between the project team. The 
contract can include owner, architect, general contractor, and other parties 
that have a primary role in the project. 
Negotiated risk 
distribution 
A document that specifies that there should be no litigation or arbitration 





APPENDIX D. C.I. METHODS DEFINITIONS 




A plan for executing a specific phase of a project by using a "pull" 
technique to determine project hand-offs. The plan is prepared through a 
conversation by the team responsible for doing the work. Work is planned 
at the request of a downstream customer. 
Co-location (Big 
Room) 
An organizational placement strategy where project team members are 
physically located close to one another to improve communications, 
working relationships, and productivity. 
Constructability 
Planning in Design 
Phase 
The optimal use of construction knowledge and experience in planning, 
design, procurement, and field operations in order to achieve overall project 




A project-focused process that builds and develops shared goals, 
interdependence, trust, commitment, and accountability, and improves team 
members’ problem-solving skills. Partnering can be further defined as a 
structured sequence of principles initiated at the start of the project, based 
on mutual objectives, that applies specific tools and techniques (e.g., 
conflict resolution techniques) to achieve the agreed-upon performance 
metrics of the project. 
Front End Planning 
(PDRI) 
The process of developing sufficient strategic information for owners to 
address risk and make decisions about committing resources to maximize 
the potential for a successful project. 
Joint Risk 
Assessment Tool 
It is used by the owner, contractor, and designer to collaboratively identify, 
evaluate, and estimate the levels of risks involved on a project and 
determine an acceptable level of risk. 
Multi-party 
Agreement 
An approach that uses one contractor for the entire project, often entered in 
by the owner, designer, general contractor, and any other party who may 
have a primary role in the project. Including all key participants in the 
contract and agreeing to the same terms and conditions enables participants 
to understand each other's roles, responsibilities, and risk. 
Multi-party Project 
Management Team 
The key decision-making body for the project, responsible for providing 
leadership and governance, ensures that the obligations of the participants 
are fulfilled and the owner's objectives are achieved 
Mutual Liability 
Waivers 
A contracting mechanism that intends to reduce liability exposure for key 
project stakeholders. Can include simple waivers of consequential damages 
to prevent the owner, contractor, or designer from seeking damages for 
delay, or can include a more comprehensive approach to include project 
performance, builder's risk, and third-party claims. 
No Dispute Charter 
An agreement that there should be no litigation or arbitration between key 





The use of offsite construction to prepare elements of a structure, often as 
modules to be assembled on site. Includes all substantial construction and 




Often referred to as “Six Sigma,” a quality process that uses techniques to 
eliminate process variation. A statistical measure used to measure the 




A lean tool commonly referred to as "Kaizen" during construction and 
design charrette during design. The workshop brings line workers into 
decision processes for improvements and focuses on making quick, feasible 
changes. 
Contract Incentives 
(Shared Risk and 
Reward) 
Incentives written in the contract combine the risks and rewards of all team 





An attempt to design elements of a facility in a consistent manner in order 
to promote repetition, increase productivity, and reduce field errors. 
Design to Cost 
(Target Value 
Design) 
It aims to increase the value delivered to the owner by collaboratively 
designing against a detailed estimate that is based on a given cost, often the 
owner's allocable cost. Ultimately, the design follows this allowable cost. 
Use of Technology as 
an Integration Tool 
A combination of the design, fabrication information, erection instructions, 
and project management logistics in one database. Provides a platform for 
collaboration throughout a project's design and construction. BIM is an 
example of how technology can be used to integrate project information. 
Value Engineering 
An organized approach to analyzing designed building features, systems, 
equipment, and material selections. Aims to achieve essential functions at 
the lowest lifecycle cost while remaining consistent with performance, 
quality, and reliability, and safety requirements. 
Value Streaming 
Mapping 
Mapping all steps in project delivery, including the flow of materials and 
information. Improves the production process by identifying unnecessary 
steps and improving the project team's understanding of the process. 
Advanced Work 
Packaging 
An overall process flow of all the detailed work packages. It is a planned 
executable process that encompasses the work on an engineering, 
procurement, and construction project, beginning with initial planning and 
continuing through detailed design and construction execution. 
A3 Decision Making 
Also referred as A3 problem solving, it is a structured problem-solving and 
continuous improvement approach. It provides a simple and strict 
procedure that guides problem solving by workers. The approach typically 




APPENDIX E. RISK ITEM EXAMPLE RISKS 
Risk Item Specific Risk Events 
Funding 
 Inflation 
 Escalation of material prices 
 Change in project funding sources 
Geotechnical and 
Subsurface 
 Ground conditions different than what was anticipated 
 Unforeseen utilities discovered 
Environmental 
 Delayed permit approvals 
 Changes in environmental regulations 
 Protected flora and fauna 
Design 
 Design errors and omissions 
 Poor constructability of designs 
 Poor operational functionality of designs 
Weather  Adverse weather conditions 
Construction 
 Construction quality issues 
 Safety incidents 
 Low labor and equipment productivity 
 Low availability of skilled labor 
 Poor construction trade coordination 
 Inaccurate cost estimates 
 Low availability of equipment and materials 
Scope Change 
 Unanticipated design or engineering changes 
 Change order negotiations 
 Scope Creep 
Political and Community 
 Public groups opposed to project 
 Political groups opposed to project 
Land Acquisition  Delays in acquisition of land 
Organizational 
 Poor communication between key project participants 
 Loss of key project personnel 




APPENDIX F. CII PROJECT SECTOR BREAKDOWN 
Project Sector Types of Projects 
Heavy Industrial  Upstream Oil and Gas 
 Refining and Petrochemical 
 Mining and Metals 
 Pulp and Paper 
 Power Generation 
 Gas Processing 
Light Industrial  Automotive Manufacturing 
 Pharmacy and Biotech 
 Consumer Products (Food and Beverage) 
Infrastructure  Power transmission 
 Pipelines 
 Transportation 
 Water and Wastewater 
Buildings  Healthcare 






APPENDIX G. PREVIOUS MODELS OF PROJECT SUCCESS 
KPI working group’s model of success 
KRA KPI Measurement 
Client 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction with Product 1 – 10 Likert Scale 
Satisfaction with Service 1 – 10 Likert Scale 
Defects 
Impact of Defects at 
Handover 
1 – 10 Likert Scale 
Cost 
Design Cost Growth 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
 
Construction Cost Growth 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
 
Total Cost Growth 




Design Schedule Growth 





𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Total Schedule Growth 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Safety Lost Time Incidents 
# 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝑥 200,000 





Franz’s model of project success 



























Quality of Building 
Systems 
Quality of envelope and 
structure 
1 – 6 Likert Scale 
Quality of interior finishes 1 – 6 Likert Scale 
Quality of environmental 
systems 




Difficulty of facility start up 1 – 6 Likert Scale 
Number and magnitude of call 
backs 
1 – 6 Likert Scale 
Operation and maintenance 
costs 
1 – 6 Likert Scale 
 
The model of project success developed by El Asmar et al. 
KRA KPI Measurement 
Customer Relations 
Return Business 1 – 5 Likert Scale 
Claims Binary scale 
Safety 
OSHA Recordables 
# 𝑂𝑆𝐻𝐴 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
$ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝑥 1,000,000 
Lost Time Injuries 






























Systems Quality 1 – 5 Likert Scale 
Deficiency Issues 1 – 5 Likert Scale 
Punchlist Items 1 – 5 Likert Scale 
Warranty Costs 0 – 2 Ordinal scale 
Cost of Latent Defects Binary scale 







RFI Processing Time Average RFI processing time in weeks 











Change Order Processing 
Time 
Average change order processing time in 
weeks 
Percent Plan Complete 
Trend 
-1 – 1 Nominal Scale 
108 
 
APPENDIX H. INITIAL LIST OF KPIS DEVELOPED DURING THE 
RESEARCH CHARRETTE 







Direct Work Rate 
# 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
 
Productivity 








Cost Certainty Cost Variation 























∑ 𝑁 𝑥 𝑤
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
 𝑥 200,000 
 
Where, 
N = # of unplanned quality events (variation, defect or failure) 
W = weighted severity level of each event 
Design defects 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠




# 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
NCRs # 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 
Commissioning 
duration 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Safety 
TRIR 
# 𝑂𝑆𝐻𝐴 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠











1-7 Likert scale: This project achieved all of the functional objectives 





















External stakeholders could include: local businesses in surrounding 






# 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
EPA Notice of 
Violation 
















# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
# Owner Initiated 
changes 
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 / 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Speed of Change 
Approval 
# of days between RFI request and closure 
 
 
